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Faculty

FIXTURE PRIORITIES
David Gray Carlson*
Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has had a
tumultuous history.' Originally, the drafters of the Code intended to
do no more than repeat the fixture rules as they had existed under the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA).^ The real estate industry had

* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
B.A., 1974, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1977, Hastings College of Law,
University of California.
' For the drafting history of section 9-313, see 2 G. Cilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property § 30.3, at 808-14 (1965); Kripke, The Review Committee's Proposals to Amend the
Fixture Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. Law. 301 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Kripke, Review Committee]; Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 44 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kripke, Fixtures]; Leary & Rucci, Fixing Up the
Fixture Section of the U.C.C., 42 Temp. L.Q. 355 (1969).
The real estate bar was quick to oppose the 1962 version of section 9-313. Its views were
given recognition by local legislatures as well as by the Permanent Editorial Board. California,
for example, never enacted the 1962 version of section 9-313 and only enacted the 1972 version in
1980, Cal. Com. Code § 9313 (West Supp. 1983). Although California had a nonuniform version
of I section 9-102 which governed the creation, perfeetion and priority of security interests in
fixtures as between competing UCC secured parties, Cal. Com. Code § 9102 (West 1964),
priority contests between fixture lenders and real estate interests were decided entirely under preUCC case law developed without regard to the Code. Cf. Note, Uniform Commercial Code
Section 9-313; Time for Adoption in California, 27 Hastings L.J. 235, 239 (1975). Iowa also
failed to adopt the 1962 version of section 9-313, id. at 236, but has now opted for the 1972
amendments, including the nevv section 9-313, Iowa Code Ann. § 554.9313 (West Supp. 1982).
Ohio passed a versioiMjf^section 9-313, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1309.32 (Page 1979), undef
which prior.real"estate interests always won over security interests in fixtures and real estate
interests subsequent to perfection of security interests in fixtures always lost. This is essentially a
reversal of the 1962 version of section 9-313. See Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for
Purchase Money Collateral; A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Yale L.J. 788, 789 (1964). Mississippi also followed Ohio's
lead. See Adams, Security Interests in Fixtures Under Mississippi's Uniform Commercial Code,
47 Miss. L.J. 831, 879-88 (1976). While Ohio and Mississippi have adopted the 1972 version of
section 9-313, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1309.32 (Page 1979), Miss. Code Ann. § 75-9-313 (1972),
Florida copied Ohio's original legislation and still has its nonuniform section 9-313 on the books,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.9-313 (West 1966). See Note, Fixture Liens Under Chapter 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Florida, 21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 229, 236 (1968).
^ The full text of section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) is as follows;
If the goods are so affixed to realty, at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently
as to become a part thereof and not to be severable wholly or in any portion without
material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so
severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed, as against any person who has
not expressly assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to realty at the
time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become part thereof but to be
severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property shall be
void after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent purchasers of the realty for
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lived with those provisions without apparent hardship. Consequently,
there was no reason to expect any objections to the perpetuation of
those principles in the UCC. Unfortunately, the discussion of the
fixture priorities under the UCC galvanized the real estate bar into a
storm of protest which broke only after the 1962 version of section 9313 was adopted into the law of most states.® As a result of this
controversy, scholars generated a great deal of literature on the "fix
ture problem," and the Permanent Editoral Board, spurred on largely
by fixtures, decided to revise all of Article 9 with a large set of
amendments. A Review Committee was appointed for this purpose,^
and their work culminated in the 1972 amendments. Section 9-313
was perhaps more radically changed than any other section of Article
9.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the complexities intro
duced by the 1972 amendments into the system of fixture priorities, a
subject which has not yet been fully explored.® Although there has
been extensive scholarly discussion of the 1962 version of section 9313, a brief review of those rules is nevertheless required in order to
understand fully the changes wrought by the 1972 amendments.

value and without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale
contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly
describing the realty and stating that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto, shall
be filed before such purchase in the offiee where a deed of the realty would be
recorded or registered to affect such realty. As against the owner of the realty the
reservation of the property in goods by a conditional seller shall be void when such
goods are to be so affixed to the realty as to become a part thereof but to be severable
without material injury to the freehold, unless the conditional sale contract, or a
copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the
realty and stating that the goods are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before they
are affixed, in the office where a deed would be recorded or registered to affect such
realty.
Unif. Conditional Sales Act § 7, reprinted in 3 L. Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional
Sales § 1436, at 512 (1933) (footnote omitted).
' Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46-47.
•• The Review Committee was composed of; Joe C. Barrett; Carl W. Funk; John S.
Hastings, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit; Robert Haydock, Jr.;
Ray David Henson; Harold Marsh, Jr.; William Curtis Pierce; Millard H. Rudd; Sterry R.
Waterman, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Herbert Wechsler
(Chairman). Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26
Bus. Law. 1465, 1466 n.7 (1971).
Professor Robert Braucher served as reporter and Professors Homer Kripke and Soia
Mentschikoff served as associate reporters. Professor Grant Gilmore and Peter F. Googan were
consultants, id. at 1466-67.
® The best article so far on the 1972 version of section 9-313 is Adams, supra note 1. It is
hoped that this article will push the analysis of section 9-313 at least a little further than that
impressive work.
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I. The 1962 Version of Section 9-313®
Prior to 1962, the UCSA was the only uniform legislation govern
ing fixture priorities. This reflected the fact that purchase money
security interests were the principal type of fixture interest for which
personal property lenders needed secured status.'' The 1962 version of
section 9-313 was simply an attempt to incorporate the provisions of

' The full text of the 1962 version of section 9-313 is as follows;
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure
in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no
security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure remains per
sonal property under applicable law. The law of this state other than this Act
determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not
prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law
applicable to real estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real
estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is valid
against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as stated
in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate at
the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing consented
to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority
over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the
extent that he makes subsequent advances if the subsequent purchase is made, the
lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or the subsequent advance under the prior
encumbrance is made or contracted for without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other
than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent pur
chaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2), (3) or (4) a secured party has priority over the
claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default, subject
to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must
reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and
who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for
any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods
removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement
may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for
the performance of this obligation.
U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962).
' See Coogan, Fixtures—Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1186, 118788 (1965); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.6, at 821 ("Almost without exception, pre-Code
fixture financing was carried out under conditional sale: the nature of the conditional sale
automatically restricted the priority to what, in Gode terminology, would be called purchase
money security interests.").
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section 7 of the UCSA into the UCC.® The result, however, was less
than perfect. The principal failure was that it introduced mutually
exclusive filing requirements.® Both the UCSA and the UCC required
a filing in the local real estate records in order for the secured party to
prevail over subsequent purchasers of the real estate. The UCSA,
however, allowed an ordinary filing to perfect a conditional sale
against subsequent lien creditors. This allowed the conditional sale to
survive in bankruptcy, as long as some sort of perfection occurred.
Under the 1962 version of the UCC, a fixture filing^® was ineffective to
perfect an interest in nonfixtures, and an ordinary UCC filing was
ineffective to perfect a fixture interest." As a result, the secured party

Purchase money security interests collateralize loans enabling the borrower to buy goods.
The collateral must be the very goods that were bought, and the loan must actually have been
used for the purchase. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972). A "conditional sale" is a purchase money security
interest where the seller of goods is also the lender. That is, the sale is made on credit. See id. §§
9-102(l)(a), -107(1). Purchase money security interests are further described in notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
® Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46.
" See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1962). New York, however, had a nonuniform UCSA provision
which did make fixture filings and nonfixture filings "mutually exclusive." See Kripke, Fixtures,
supra note 1, at 56.
The term "fixture filing" was used for the first time in the 1972 amendments. U.C.C. § 9313(1) (b) (1972). Under the 1972 amendments, a "fixture filing" is a filing in the local real estate
records in a form which comports with the 1972 version of section 9-402(5). Section 9-402(5)
requires that, in addition to the minimal requirements of section 9-402(1), the financing state
ment recite that the collateral is in fact a fixture, and that the statement is to be filed in the real
estate records. If the debtor does not have an interest in the real estate, the financing statement
must also state the name of "a record owner."
The term "fixture filing" will also be used to refer to the special filing that had to be made
for fixtures under the 1962 UCC. Under those rules, the only formality required beyond those
necessary for an ordinary UCC filing was that the financing statement describe the real estate
affected. Then, as now, the financing statement had to be filed in the "office where a mortgage
on the real estate would be filed." Id. § 9-401(1).
" Under all three options for section 9-401 of the 1962 version, a fixture filing had to be
made in the "office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded."
Such a filing would not have satisfied the filing requirements for nonfixture collateral under the
first of the options, which contemplates filing only with the secretary of state. Under the other
two options, it was not impossible for a 1962 fixture filing in the local real estate records to have
sufficed in perfecting unaffixed collateral. The second and third alternatives allowed filing for
farm equipment or consumer goods in the county of the debtor's residence or (if the debtor did
not reside in the state) in the county where the goods were kept. If this office happened to be the
same office that received mortgage filings, perhaps a fixture filing would have sufficed to perfect
an interest in unaffixed collateral. See id. § 9-403(1) (1962) (mere presentation of the statement
and paying the fee constitutes filing) ; Adams, supra note 1, at 859 n.93. But see In re Leckie
Freeburn Coal Co., 405 F.2d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) ("It is
true that the proper Clerk did receive the instrument for filing. . . . However, this was not
sufficient to comply with the [UCC]. . . . [M]ore is required of the filing party than to just hand
the instrument to the Clerk. . . . When dealing with a multipurpose document, it is incumbent
upon the filing party to disclose to the Clerk the purpose for recording.").
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faced a hazardous election; if he chose incorrectly, he could find his
security interest voided in bankruptcy. Of course, a cautious secured
party could always have made both a fixture filing and a nonfixture
filing. This, however, was not always a viable option. For example,
where a purchase money lender took a security interest in potential
fixtures sold to a corporation that owned real property in various
locations,'^ it would have been difficult to make a fixture filing in
exactly the right office." Elimination of mutual exclusivity of filings
was a major motivation for amending the 1962 fixture provisions. This
goal, as will be shown," has not yet been fully realized.
The major function of the fixture rules was the resolution of
priority conflicts between the fixture lenders and real estate claimants.
The priorites under the 1962 version of section 9-313 are perhaps best
illustrated by considering the six logical temporal possibilities that
exist between the three important events that are relevant to establish
ing priorities. The three events are; (a) accrual of the competing real
estate interest, whether a judicial lien, a mortgage, or a purchase; (b)
affixation of the personal property to the real estate; and (c) attach
ment of the Article 9 security interest to the collateral. Using a mort
gagee, for the moment, as a stand-in for all real estate claimants, the
six possible temporal patterns are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation;
Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment;
Attachment-Mortgage-Affixation;
Affixation-Mortgage-Attachment;
Attachment-Affixation-Mortgage;
Affixation-Attachment-Mortgage.

'2 See Kratovil, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Real Property Lawyer, 18 De Paul
L. Rev. 101, 107 (1968); Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1319, 1334-35 (1962). According to Professor Gilmore, "The diversity of
real estate recording systems approaches infinity." 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 818.
" In many cases, a lender assumed that his collateral was equipment only to have a court
deem it a fixture, e.g., Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d
441 (1964). Even more common were those situations where a conditional seller, assuming the
goods to be fixtures, filed locally, only to have the court deem them to be equipment—for which
central filing was necessary. See, e.g., In re Park Corrugated Box Corp., 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J.
1966); In re Kahl, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1322 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1972); In re
Nelson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857 (Bankr. D. Utah 1969). See generally J. White &
R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 25-9, at 1057 (2d ed. 1980) (requirements for filing
under section 9-313(l)(h)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 52-68.
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A. Case One: Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation and Section 9-313(2)
According to the drafters, where the mortgage was already in
place before attachment or affixation of the collateral, the mortgagee
was no longer a "reliance creditor"'® who depended on the state of the
real estate records in deciding whether or not to lend.'® Thus, under
section 9-313(2), which covered all "attachment-then-affixation"
cases, the secured party won over the prior mortgagee whether or not
his interest was perfected.'''
In addition to the "absence of reliance" theory, two other theo
ries supported the priority rules of section 9-313(2). The premise of the
first was that the secured party added to the value of the real estate in
an "attachment-then-affixation" case, and therefore should be the
first to recover that value in case of default.'® The thinking was that
giving priority to the earlier mortgage would provide the mortgagee
with a windfall at the expense of the subsequent fixture lender.'®

" The emphasis on "reliance" conformed to section 7 of the UCSA, which only required
filing for protection against "subsequent purchasers" of real estate. According to Professor
Gilmore, the protection of unperfected purchase money security interests from subordination to
earlier "after-acquired property" interests dated back to the 19th century railroad cases. 2 G.
Gilmore, supra note 1, § 28.1, at 743-48.
This view was criticized by Peter Coogan on the theory that mortgagees might rely on the
absence of subsequent encumbrances in deciding whether or not to foreclose on the mortgage.
Coogan, The New UGC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 493 (1973). Since Mr. Coogan was a
consultant to the Review Committee which drafted the 1972 amendments, he was in an excellent
position to weave this view into the fabric of the new section 9-313. See General Comment on the
Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9, 3 U.L.A. 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Review
Committee]. Today, perfection is required if the secured party is to have priority over earlier real
estate interests. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a), (c) (1972).
" Hartford Nafl Bank & Trust Co. v. Codin, 137 Vt. 39, 398 A.2d 286 (1979); Babson
Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ca. App. 266, 246 S.E.2d 354 (1978). For a
case where the language of section 9-313(2) of the 1962 version of the UCC was inexplicably
ignored, see United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 892, 903 (W.D. Ark. 1964)
("A purchase money security interest in . . . 'fixtures' must meet the filing requirements ... in
. . . 9-401(l)(b) to take priority over prior encumbrances of the real estate.")
Shanker, supra note 1, at 791. Of course, the value of the land might be reduced by the
damage done when the secured party repossesses and the fixture is removed. Section 9-313(5)
(1962), renumbered 9-313(8) in 1972, requires the fixture lender to hold the prior real estate
owner or encumbrancer harmless by reimbursing him "for the cost of repair of any physical
injury." Even so, real estate owners and encumbrancers might still complain that reimbursement
under section 9-313(8) denies them the "going concern" value of the real estate. Adams, supra
note 1, at 855 n.74.
This ignores the fact that many fixtures are replacements for those already in place at the
time the mortgage interest arose. Since the value of the mortgagee's interest encompassed the
value of the original fixtures, it could he argued that giving him priority in the new fixtures
would in no way provide him a windfall. See Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43
Del. 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1941). In Keil, a furnace which had been in place at the time
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From the standpoint of the earlier mortgagee, the priorities under
section 9-313(2) were not believed to be prejudicial since the value of
the real estate would be enhanced by at least the value of the fixture.
In fact, priority for fixture financing was thought to be a positive
benefit to the real estate mortgagee, since the premises could thereby
be kept in good repair.^"
The second theory underlying section 9-313(2) related to the
simple order of property transfer. By the time the personal property
was affixed, it had already been encumbered by the secured party's
interest. The mortgage lien could, therefore, attach only to the
debtor's equity, if any, and not to that part of the fixture collateral
already subject to a security interest.
These three theories are also the general justifications for pur
chase money priority. The 1962 version of section 9-313(2) did not
require purchase money status, yet these purchase money justifica
tions applied equally well to nonpurchase money security interests in
fixtures where there had been "attachment-then-affixation." In fact,
the "property transfer" theory had greater validity in fixture cases
than in other purchase money cases. In a straight purchase money
case, involving personal property, where a prior secured party or lien
creditor had a right to after-acquired property, the interests of the two
secured parties and the debtor all arose simultaneously.Neverthe
less, the "already encumbered" reasoning of the "property transfer"
theory was thought to be applicable.In a fixture case, it is inevitable
that the prior mortgagee cannot obtain an interest in the collateral
until it has been affixed and has become real estate. Where attach-

the mortgage arose was removed and replaced with a new one that was subject to a conditional
sales agreement. Because the old furnace was "worthless" at the time of its removal, the court
concluded that its removal could have had "no effect upon the security of the mortgage." Id. at
331, 47 A.2d at 168. Thus, giving the mortgagee priority over the conditional seller would be
providing him a windfall. Cf. Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 313, 178 A. 788
(1935). Under circumstances similar to those in Keil, the court held, inter alia, that where new
fixtures are substitutes for those in place when the mortgage arose, the conditional seller's
attempt to reserve title was void as against the nonassenting mortgagee.
Professor Gilmore wrote that the problem of waste, followed by replacement with encum
bered goods, was wisely ignored by the drafters of the 1962 Code and suggests that pre-Code
cases such as Lumpkin might still govern. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.6, at 836.
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-17.
" See Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. at 271 246
S.E.2d at 358.
" See United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 364-65 (1870); Robinson
V. Wright, 90 Colo. 417, 9 P.2d 618 (1932). This is the "delightful idea of transitory or
instantaneous seisin." Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev 1333 1340
(1963).
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ment preceded affixation, the secured party's interest in the collateral
was clearly prior in time, not merely simultaneous. Section 9-313(2),
therefore, could be viewed as a "first in time is first in right" rule'
whereas standard purchase money priority cannot be so easily
viewed.^'
B. Case Two: Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment and Section 9-313(3)
In those cases where the collateral was affixed to the real estate
before the security interest attached,^^ the priorities were the reverse
of those under 9-313(2). Under 9-313(3), the prior mortgagee always
won, and the secured party could do nothing (absent a subordination
agreement) to achieve priority.
In an affixation-then-attachment case, the purchase money
theories supporting the priority rule of 9-313(2) were inapposite. Here
the secured party took an interest in collateral that was already sub
ject to the mortgage lien. In this circumstance, the rule of "first in
time is first in right" demanded that the mortgagee win. Further
more, the secured party, rather than adding value to the real estate,
was doing quite the opposite. He was clearly depriving it of value!
The secured party would, therefore, lose his claim to priority over the
previous mortgagee.
Subordination to earlier mortgagees did not render financing
impossible where affixation preceded attachment. The fixture lender
could still have priority over subsequent purchasers or subsequent lien

Professors Jackson and Kronman add yet another justification for purchase money prior
ity. They point out that without purchase money priority, a lender with an after-acquired
property interest can prevent other lenders from being senior, has already sunk policing costs,
and therefore has monopoly power over the debtor who needs another loan. The purchase
money priority, however, allows another lender to bid against the after-acquired property lender
for the debtor s business, thereby eliminating the monopoly power held by the after-acquired
property lender. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors 88
Yale L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1979).
This same rationale works for nonpurchase money security interests in fixtures. An earlier
real estate mortgagee also has a competitive advantage for making future fixture loans unless
priority can be given to some other lender. Section 9-312(2) (1962) therefore allows for competi
tion in making loans to the debtor on property which is to become fixtures.
E.g., State Bank v. Kahn, 58 Misc. 2d 655, 296 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (lender did
not advance funds for swimming pool until construction was complete).
The opposite result is illustrated by Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Mise. 2d
780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1970). There, the failure to execute a written security agree
ment prior to the affixation of the collateral defeated the interest of the conditional seller.
The result in Sunshine was approved by the 1972 amendments, which require a writing as a
precondition to attachment. U.C.C. § 9-203 (Reasons for 1972 Change). See infra note 123.
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creditors if he perfected his interest or if the holder of the subsequent
interest had knowledge of the intervening fixture interest.He could
also have priority over the subsequent advances made by the earlier
mortgagee, if the mortgagee had knowledge of the unperfected secur
ity interest, or if the security interest had been perfected by the time of
the advance.
The use of goods already affixed to real estate as collateral was an
innovation over the UCSA.^® The post-affixation security interest was
not, however, the only "real estate" in which a chattel security inter
est could be created. It may seem anomalous that "real estate" could
be encumbered by chattel security interests. Yet many states have
always allowed for the creation of chattel mortgages on crops.To
day, the UCC allows security interests in three different types of real
estate—crops, timber, and, of course, fixtures.
C. Cases Three and Four: Where the Mortgage Arose Between At
tachment and Affixation
In his article on the 1962 fixture rules, Mr. Coogan wondered
whether a real estate interest which accrued between attachment and
affixation or between affixation and attachment was subsequent or
prior to the security interest.^® While there was legitimate confusion
where future advances under a mortgage were involved,®® the result in
other cases was quite clear. When the mortgage arose between the
two Article 9 events it was clearly a prior mortgage explicitly gov
erned by section 9-313(2) (if attachment preceded affixation) and by
section 9-313(3) (if the temporal order was reversed). "Subsequent,"
therefore, as used in section 9-313(4) could only have meant "subse
quent to both attachment and affixation." Only where the mortga
gee's interest arose after the two events could section 9-313(4) govern
the priorities.®^ Thus, the priority of the secured fixture lender vis-a-

" U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(1962); see infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 55.
" Modesto Bank v. Owens, 121 Cal. 223, 53 P. 552 (1898). See generally Smith, Security
Interests in Crops, 10 Hastings L.J. 23, 156 (1958).
Section 9-105(l)(h) includes fixtures, standing timber and growing crops in the definition
of "goods." See U.C.C.§ 9-102(l)(a) ("this Article applies ... to any transaction . . . which is
intended to create a security interest in . . . goods"). Significantly, unsevered minerals are not
goods under section 9-105(l)(h).
Coogan, supra note 7, at 1228 n.l8; see also Adams, supra note 1, at 848-49.
See infra text accompanying notes 34-40.
" Coogan reaches the same result by means of a policy argument based on the reasoning
that, in an "attachment-mortgage-affixation" case, the mortgagee would not rely on subsequent
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vis the mortgagee in these types of "sandwich" cases depended solely
upon the order in which attachment and affixation had occurred.
D. Cases Five and Six: Subsequent Mortgages and Seetion 9-313(4)
Under the 1962 Code, perfection of security interests in fixtures
was necessary or helpful only where a real estate interest arose subse
quent to both attachment and affixation.^® The unperfected secured
party could still gain priority if the mortgagee had "knowledge" of the
unperfected secured interest.®® The effect of "knowledge" on the or
dering of priorities was consistent with the prevailing theory of the
1962 Code—that it was to be, in large part, a "race-notice" statute,
not a "race" statute.®^
Under section 9-313(4) of the 1962 Code, particular complexity
occurred in the context of future advances made under a real estate
mortgage after the security interest attached to affixed collateral but
before it was perfected. Section 9-313(4)(c) expressly stated that all
future advances made under prior mortgages were to be considered
subsequent to the extent of the advance. No distinction was made
between discretionary and obligatory future advances. Ironically, the
1962 Code provided that a security interest for an obligatory future
advance attached at the time the commitment was made.®® This rule.

encumbrances in deciding whether to acquire a real estate interest. The statutory demonstration
in the text, however, renders Coogan's reliance on "policy" unnecessary. Accord Leary & Rucci,
supra note 1, at 384-85.
These subsequent interests include buyers. Meads v. Dial Fin. Co., 56 Ala. App. 84, 319
So. 2d 281 (1975); subsequent mortgagees, Tillotson v. Stephens, 195 Neb. 104, 237 N.W.2d 108
(1975); and the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, who has the status of a hypothetical lien creditor
under state law as of the day the petition for bankruptcy is filed. In re New Hope & I.R.R., 353
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For a discussion of the bankruptcy trustee's status under the 1972
amendments to the UCC and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA), 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp.
V 1981), see infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1962); see O'Dell v. Kunkel's, Inc., 581 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1978)
(unperfected security interest in fixtures had no priority over claims of subsequent purchaser
without knowledge); McCarthy v. Bank, 283 Pa. Super. 328, 423 A.2d 1280 (1980) (unperfected
security interest in fixtures had priority over interest of subsequent purchaser who had knowl
edge).
" In ordinary personal property cases, lien creditors and purchasers could take priority over
an unperfected security interest only if they were without knowledge of it. Competing secured
parties did not fall within this rule. Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(a) (1962) (the only part of
section 9-301(1) with no knowledge requirement) with U.C.C. § 9-312 (1972) (knowledge
ordinarily plays no part in determining priorities between secured parties). According to Profes
sor Gilmore, the adoption of a "race only" concept between secured parties came about as the
result of a drafting accident. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 34.2, at 898.
U.G.C. § 1-201(4) (1962). Commentators were split as to whether discretionary future
advances related back to attachment of the prior security interest or whether they gave rise to a
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however, did not govern mortgages, although real estate law had
analogous rules which allowed relation back to the priority of the
original mortgage in the case of obligatory advances.®® It was, there
fore, unclear whether all future advances were to be considered "sub
sequent" under section 9-313(4) and hcncc not subject to the benefits
and burdens of sections 9-313(2) or (3), or whether only discretionary
future advances were covered by section 9-313(4) (c).
In one leading case. House v. Long,®^ the court read 9-313(4)(c)
to mean that future advances, whether obligatory or discretionary,
never related back to the priority of preaffixation advances under the
mortgage. In that case, a mortgagee had been subordinated under
section 9-313(2) but was given a new lease on life as to his obligatory
future advances under section 9-313(4) (c), which were held not to
relate back to the low priority of the initial mortgage. The court's
treatment of obligatory future advances was notable on two counts.
First, it proved that relation back was not always helpful to mortga
gees. It was helpful only when the mortgagee was senior as to the
initial part of the mortgage debt. Where the initial part of the mort
gage debt was junior, as it was in House v. Long, relation back was
undesirable. Second, in holding that obligatory future advances under

new and separate security interest when the advance was actually made. Compare R. Henson,
Handbook of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code § 5-14, at 10102 (1973) ("the distinction in this context between voluntary and obligatory advances [is]
meaningless") with Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 71 (only future advances that were
contracted for are protected). The 1972 amendments have adopted the view that discretionary
advances give rise to separate security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), -307(3) (1972).
The priority of future advances is important whenever the status of the secured party
depends on perfection. Between secured parties, priority goes to the party who is the first to
perfect or file. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972).
G. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages § 120 (2d ed. 1970). The rule in a
majority of jurisdictions is that if a future advance made under a mortgage is "obligatory," it has
the priority of (i.e. relates back in time to) the original mortgage in which the obligation to lend
was made. Treatment of "discretionary" future advances varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In most states, the discretionary advance relates back to the priority of the original mortgage
unless the mortgagee had actual knowledge of the intervening lien claiming priority over the
future advance; recordation or "perfection" is not strictly relevant in such states. A minority of
jurisdictions subordinate the discretionary future advance if the intervening lien is recorded,
even if the mortgagee had no knowledge of the lien at the time of the advance. The theory here is
that the mortgagee has "constructive" knowledge of the intervening lien. These jurisdictions, of
course, make it necessary for mortgagees to check the records before making every new discre
tionary advance. In a few states, discretionary advances relate back in all circumstances and are
therefore indistinguishable from obligatory advances. See id. §§ 120-21; Comment, Mortgages
to Secure Future Advances: Problems of Priority and the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46
Miss. L.J. 433, 434-41 (1975).
244 Ark. 718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968).

392

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:381

the mortgage had no relation back feature, the court was ignoring the
UCC rule that would have applied to personal property security
interests'® and the real property rule that would have applied to
mortgages.'® Only where the two bodies of law—each agreeing upon
the proper position to take—collided and overlapped was a different
rule created. Arkansas has now passed the 1972 amendments and has
therefore ended this curious anomaly.''®
Another problem facing the mortgagee under section 9-313(4) of
the 1962 Code was his status at a foreclosure sale as a purchaser of the
property on which he had an encumbrance.
Neither mortgagees nor lien creditors are allowed to keep the
land in which they have an interest.^' Mortgage liens and judgment
liens are real estate interests which secure the payment of debt. The
encumbered real estate must therefore be sold in order to reduce it to
money, the language in which the mortgage debt and judgment are
expressed.''^ When a foreclosure sale occurs, an issue arises as to
whether the purchaser at the sale should be considered a "subsequent"
purchaser with priority over unperfected security interests in fixtures
which attached prior to the sale. Section 9-313(4) expressly addressed
this issue, giving the subsequent purchaser priority, but it had a
curious exclusion. Whereas purchasers at foreclosure sales generally
received protected status afforded subsequent purchasers in other situ
ations,'" purchasers who were also the mortgagees of the property
instigating the sale were denied protection.

U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1972).
" See, e.g.. United States v. Westmoreland Manganese Corp., 134 F. Supp 898, 932 (E.D.
Ark. 1955) (obligatory future advances made pursuant to a construction mortgage have priority
over intervening mechanic liens), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Latrobe
Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 890 (1957); First Nafl Bank v.
Conway Sheet Metal Co., 244 Ark. 963, 428 S.W.2d 293 (1968) (obligatory future advance has
priority over intervening materialman's lien). See also Lyman Lamb Co. v. Union Bank, 237
Ark. 629, 374 S.W.2d 820 (1964) (where advances found to be optional and not obligatory,
mortgagee's notice of intervening lien caused future advance to be subordinated to that lien).
Act of Feb. 13, 1973, § 1, 1973 Ark. Acts 345 (codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-9-101
(Supp. 1981)). The 1972 amendments no longer legislate the priority of future advances under
mortgages. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
" Cf. Onyx Ref. Co. v. Evans Prod. Corp., 182 F. Supp 253, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ("A
judgment lien does not create any right of property or interest in the lands upon which it is a lien.
It gives the right to foreclosure, either by execution or independent suit, which, when done, will
relate back so as to exclude adverse interests subsequent to the fixing of the lien.").
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972) (secured party may keep the collateral on default if the
debtor or junior secured parties do not object).
" See Architectural Cabinet, Inc. v. Manley, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 263 (Pa. C.P.
1966); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 28.7, at 773 n.6.
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This exclusion was borrowed, apparently without much thought,
from the case law under the UCSA.^^ In choosing such a rule, the
drafters of the original section 9-313 ignored the debate as to whether
such purchasers deserved the protection of the recording statutes. A
respectable vein of opinion thought they did deserve it, since protec
tion of ignorant mortgagees who purchased at their own foreclosure
sales would help make those sales more efficient and thus help make
real estate financing a more desirable lending device. The contrary
view was that recording statutes were designed solely to keep the
ordinary course of business running smoothly. Foreclosure sales were
not in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, recording stat
utes should never protect purchasers at such sales, especially not the
very mortgagee or lien creditor who sponsored the foreclosure sale.
Such a creditor-purchaser, after all, did not part with money but
merely offset the debt owed to him.^®
The importance of preventing mortgagees at their own sales from
being protected against subsequent purchasers under section 9-313(4)
should not be overestimated. It was a very narrowly drawn provision
that adversely affected only junior encumbrances. Senior mortgagees
presumably have the power under nonuniform real estate law to
foreclose competing junior liens and security interests by their foreclo
sure sale.^® If such a power exists, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
took the land free of any foreclosed lien, regardless of his knowledge of
these liens. Purchaser protection under section 9-313(4) was therefore
irrelevant when a senior encumbrance was foreclosed; denial of it to
senior mortgagees who purchased at their own foreclosure sale was,
therefore, also quite beside the point. Even among junior mortgagees,
the exclusion had less than universal application. If the mortgagee was
junior under section 9-313(2)—because the collateral was already
encumbered with a security interest at the time of affixation—the
narrow exclusion did apply, so that the junior mortgagee was not
permitted to bootstrap himself up to senior "purchaser" status by

" E.g., Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 Del. 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct.
1941).
For an exeellent discussion of these issues, see Pugh v. Highley, 152 Ind. 252, 53 N.E. 171
(1899).
E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1352 (MeKinney 1979). One unanswered question is
the extent to which nonuniform law can destroy Article 9 security interests in light of section 9201, which states, "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective . . .
against purchasers of the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (emphasis added). The author
intends to explore this conundrum in a separate article on lien foreclosure in general.
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purchasing at his own foreclosure sale. Even if he had the requisite
ignorance at the time of the purchase, the mortgagee was to remain
junior. But as to mortgagees who were junior by virtue of section 9313(4)—because they obtained their mortgage with knowledge after
affixation and attachment of a still unperfected security interest—the
exclusion was irrelevant. Their knowledge would have kept them
from being senior purchasers, even without the exelusion in ques
tion.'*'''
One complexity that existed before the 1972 amendments related
to mortgagees who took by assignment from a previous mortgagee. A
technical reading of section 9-313(4) (a) indicates that the assignment
of the mortgage made the successor mortgagee a "subsequent pur
chaser."*® A mortgage that had been senior in the hands of the as
signor became junior in the hands of the assignee if, between the
creation of the mortgage and its assignment, the assignee obtained
knowledge of the unperfected security interest in fixtures or if the
secured party properly perfected his interest. Conversely, a junior
mortgage (under section 9-313(2)) became senior in the hands of an
assignee without knowledge of an unperfected security interest.
Again, once the mortgagee established senior status, he could buy
freely at his own foreclosure sale, since nonuniform foreclosure law
destroys all junior liens, regardless of the purchaser's knowledge. Or
dinarily, one would have expeeted that the assignee took the exaet
status of his assignor, an expectation that the 1972 amendments have
effectuated.'*®
11. The 1972 Amendments
In response to the avalanche of criticism of and commentary on
the 1962 version of section 9-313, the 1972 amendments to seetion 9-

•''' The narrow exclusion under discussion also did not apply where the mortgagee was junior
under section 9-313(2), where the fixture interest was later perfected, and where the junior
mortgagee purchased at his own sale. In such a case, no purchaser at the sale would have been
protected, so that the exclusion of the mortgagee-purchaser was irrelevant.
"The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority over (a) a
subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate . . .
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)
(1962) (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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313®® incorporated eight major initiatives, one of which merely clari
fied preexisting law.®'
The official text of the 1972 amendments to Section 9-313 is as follows;
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to
fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real
estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law —
(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are
or are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subsection (5) of
Section 9-402 —
(c) a mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an
obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the
acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates. —
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are
fixtures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest
exists under this Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improve
ment on land.
(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures
pursuant to real estate law.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security
interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten
days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in
possession of the real estate; or —
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any
conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate;
or —
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily
removable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and
before the goods become fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method
permitted by this Article; or —
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or
equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method per
mitted by this Article. —
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security
interest or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or —
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer
or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest
continues for a reasonable time. —
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to
subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures
before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a
construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the
construction mortgage.
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The first and most imperative of the initiatives may also be (so
far) the least successful. The initiative was designed to eliminate the
need to elect between a fixture filing (not effective to perfect a nonfixture interest) and an ordinary UCC filing (not effective to perfect
fixture interests) which existed under the 1962 Code. This system
posed a bankruptcy risk, since the trustee could avoid the security
interest in fixtures when the secured party relied upon the wrong kind
of filing.®^
Professor Kripke, a principal drafter of the amendments to sec
tion 9-313,®^ introduced the notion that "perfection" need not imply
the establishment of priority over every possible claimant. He thought
that an ordinary UCC filing should be sufficient to "perfect" against
lien creditors and hence against bankruptcy trustees (claimants who
would not be expected to search real estate records). If priority over
real estate purchasers and mortgagees were desired, a more compli
cated fixture filing, designed to give notice to real estate title search
ers, should be made.®^ As a result of this thinking, the 1972 amend
ment to section 9-313 requires only "perfec[tion] by any method" to
gain priority over subsequent lien creditors.®® Since bankruptcy trust
ees were deemed "subsequent lien creditors,"®® it was hoped®'' that

(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest in fixtures is
subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related
real estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of
the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his
collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of
the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of
repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate
caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A
person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured
party gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
U.C.C. § 9-313 (1972).
" See infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
Henson, Fixtures; A Commentary on the Officially Proposed Changes in Article 9, 52
Marq. L. Rev. 179, 181 n.ll (1968).
^ Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 59-60.
55 U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) (1972).
55 Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act), § 70(c) (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1981)). The BRA provision stipulates that the trustee is a
hypothetical lien creditor on the day of the bankruptcy petition. Section 70(c) was more vague as
to the time limitations on the trustee's hypothetical lien creditor power, but the Supreme Court
construed the statute to limit lien creditor status as of the day of bankruptcy. Lewis v. Manufac
turers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
5' See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-8. ("It is hoped that since the fixture
security interest arises against the goods in their capacity as chattels, the bankruptcy courts will
apply the judgment creditor test.").
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this requirement would preserve the secured fixture interest against
invalidation in bankruptcy.
The effect of the 1972 amendments under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 (1898 Act) had been extremely doubtful. Under section 70(c)—
the so-called strong arm statute—the bankruptcy trustee might have
been a mere hypothetical lien creditor on the day of bankruptcy (and
hence could be defeated by an ordinary UCC filing), but he also had a
different and more potent power under section 60, the preference
statute. One of the aims of preference law—aside from guaranteeing
that creditors cannot raid the debtor's estate on the eve of bank
ruptcy—was the persecution of the secret lien.®® This, of course, is
really a fraudulent conveyance idea; but from earliest times, section
60 tried to obliterate the secret lien by deeming that a transfer of the
debtor's personal property occurred only when it was so far perfected
as to have priority over a subsequent lien creditor. Such a rule tended
to transform contemporaneous transfers of property (which are not
preferences) into transfers in satisfaction of antecedent debt.®® Not
withstanding Professor Kripke's suggested reform of section 9-313, a
fixture interest perfected only by a UCC filing was a voidable prefer
ence in bankruptcy because a transfer of "real estate" had to be
perfected against a bona fide purchaser of real estate. A fixture inter
est protected against a subsequent lien creditor, therefore, was still a
"secret lien" as far as section 60 was concerned, because fixtures are
real estate,®" and only a fixture filing could perfect the interest against
a hypothetical subsequent bona fide purchaser of real estate.®'
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA) recognized
this problem and attempted to supplement the 1972 amendments to
section 9-313 with language that would preserve fixture interests per
fected by an ordinary UCC filing. They did so by specifying that
fixtures should be considered personal property, rather than real es
tate, and that only the lien creditor test could be used to challenge an
Article 9 security interest in fixtures.®^ Unfortunately, Congress lost
sight of the fixture problem when it redrafted the trustee's strong-arm
power. Under section 70(c), the trustee had always been a hypotheti
cal lien creditor on the day of bankruptcy; under section 544(a), he

See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 13, § 24-4, at 999.
See Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences, 3 Cardozo L. Rev.
357, 372-78 (1982).
U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1972).
Breitowitz, supra note 59, at 384-87.
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
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also became a hypothetical purchaser of real estate on the day of
bankruptcy." In drafting section 544(a), Congress forgot that fixtures
are real estate and that an ordinary UCC filing by a secured party
would not perfect a fixture interest against a hypothetical purchaser of
real estate.®" The characterization of fixtures as personal property in
section 547 was for purposes of preference law only, and not for
purposes of seetion 544.
This drafting error was spotted soon after the BRA became law,
and Congress is already pondering a technical amendment to section
544(a) to make clear that fixtures are to be considered personal prop
erty.®® The amendment, however, has not passed Congress as of the
date of this Article's publication. Thus, despite twenty years of regret
that a secured party must, at his peril, "elect" to make a fixture filing
or a regular UCC filing, that eleetion must still be made.®®
There is a further bankruptcy risk aside from the failure of
Congress to coordinate section 544(a) with the 1972 amendments.
Whereas affixed collateral is saved from lien creditors by an ordinary
UCC filing, unaffixed collateral is not necessarily saved by a fixture
filing.®^ A fixture lender who chooses to make only a fixture filing may

» Id. § 544(a)(3).
See, e.g.. In re Boots Builders Inc., II Bankr. 635, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In Boots, the
defendant installed air conditioners on the bankrupt's real estate. After the plaintiff filed for
bankruptcy, the defendant quickly filed notice of a materialman's lien on the air conditioners.
Under Texas lien law, the filing established the lien's priority over any judicial lien intervening
between installation of the air conditioners and the filing. Thus, the hypothetical lien creditor m
bankruptcy was beaten. See II U.S.C. § 546(b)(Supp. V 1981). The filing, however, had only a
prospective effect with regard to bona fide purchasers of real estate. Therefore, the bankruptcy
court ruled that, as of the day of bankruptcy, the fixture interest was unperfected against a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real estate under section 544(a)(3), and was therefore void^
The Bankruptcy Technical Amendments Act, first introduced in 1979, proposes to amend
section 544(a)(3) of the BRA by excepting fixtures from the real estate category therein. S. 658,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23,513-320 (1979). The same act was proposed by the 97th
Congress, H.R. 3705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. H2437 (I98I), and will presumably
be reintroduced during the 98th Congress.
Of course, no such bankruptcy risk exists if the collateral falls within the narrow category
of readily removable machines and replacements of consumer appliances. U.C.C. § 9-3I3(4)(c)
(1972); see infra text aceompanying notes 112-18.
Even with regard to ordinary fixture collateral, the secured party has moved forward from
his position under the 1898 Act. Under section 60, the deadline for making a fixture filing was
the latest of either the debtor's insolvency, the secured party's knowledge or reason to know of
the debtor's insolvency, or the start of the four month preference period. If the fixture filing was
made thereafter, the fixture interest became a voidable preference. Under the BRA, the absence
of a fixture filing is irrelevant to preference liability. The deadline for the fixture filing has
therefore been moved back by section 544(a)(3) to the date of the bankruptcy petition.
Of course the "right place" for unaffixed collateral under section 9-401(1) might coincidentally be the "right place" for affixed collateral as well. In that case there would be no risk
from the debtor's failure to affix prior to bankruptcy. See supra note II.
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have an unperfected security interest until the collateral is affixed to
the land described in the financing statement. The secured party,
therefore, takes a risk that bankruptcy may occur before affixation.®®
The second and "weightiest"®® initiative of the 1972 amendments
gives superpriority to construction mortgagees. In this type of transac
tion, the mortgagee lends the money actually used to buy the personal
property that later becomes fixtures. Under the 1962 Code, a con
struction mortgage was treated in the same manner as any other prior
mortgage.''® Any security interest, perfected or not, had priority over
the construction mortgage, provided that attachment preceded affix
ation. Thus, a construction mortgagee could supply the purchase
money for personal property intended for affixation to the real estate,
only to have that personal property become the collateral for a nonpurchase money lender who gave a second loan.''' Today, the con
struction mortgagee cannot be subordinated to a second lender while
construction of the building is ongoing.''^
With the superpriority given to construction mortgagees, the
Review Committee supposed it solved a second problem under the
1962 Code—the priority accorded to future advances under the real
estate mortgage. Whereas the 1962 version of section 9-313(4) (c) spe
cifically stated that future advances under a prior mortgage were to
be treated as "subsequent" mortgage debt, the current version of
section 9-313 is silent on this point. But construction mortgagees are
not the only mortgagees who give future advances. Ordinary mortga
gees might also do so.'® Thus, priority conflicts involving future ad-

See Adams, supra note 1, at 914.
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-17.
™ E.g., House V. Long, 244 Ark.'718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968).
" See Coogan, supra note 16, at 498-99.
U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972). The superpriority is limited to fixtures that are installed after
the construction mortgage is recorded and that are not readily removable—i.e., collateral
covered by section 9-313(4)(a). Section 9-313(6) specifically contemplates that fixture security
interests perfected by a fixture filing before the construction mortgage is recorded, U.C.C. § 9313(4)(b), and readily removable collateral of the sort covered by section 9-313(4)(c) not be
subject to the construction mortgagee's superpriority. The rationale behind section 9-313(4)(c) is
that readily removable office machines and consumer goods are not related to construction of the
building. See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-9; Coogan, supra note 16, at 498-99.
" See Adams, supra note 1, at 925. Professor Adams has discovered an inconsistency with
regard to future advances given by a mortgagee who is junior under section 9-313(4)(a).
Logically, such a mortgagee can never be a construction mortgagee; otherwise, he would be
senior under section 9-313(6). If the advance under the mortgage is discretionary, it would not
relate back to the junior status of the underlying mortgage under the law of most states.
Therefore, the advance would be considered a "new" subsequent mortgage, which is governed
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vances under a nonconstruction mortgage remains unresolved. The
better view is probably to treat future advances as they would be
treated under real estate law. Thus, obligatory advances would relate
back to the time when the commitment was actually given, whereas
discretionary advances might or might not.'''*
In a third initiative, knowledge of the real estate claimant has
been made irrelevant to priorites under section 9-313. The 1962 Code
had been in part a "race-notice" statute. While a secured party's
knowledge was rarely material to his priority,^® the knowledge of lien
creditors and those buyers not protected by section 9-307(1) could
subordinate them to unperfected security interests.''® The 1972 amend
ments generally eliminated knowledge as a disability for lien creditors
in section 9-301(1)(b)'" (though not for buyers)''® as well as for priori
ties governed by section 9-313. Today, section 9-313 is entirely a
"race" statute and has no "notice" features.™
The fourth initiative instituted by the Review Committee has
removed the possibility of a secured party having priority over an
earlier real estate interest unless the security interest has been per
fected. Today, in order for a secured party to prevail over a mortga
gee whose interest arose earlier in time, he must file a fixture filing
under section 9-313(4)(a) within ten days of affixation of the collateral
to the real estate. Furthermore, if the collateral is "readily removable"
within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (c), the secured party can
prevail only if he perfects (by any means permitted by the Article)

under section 9-313(4)(b). There, we learn that the mortgage is senior to the perfected fixture
interest, because the mortgage was "of record" before the fixture filing was made. See Adams,
supra note 1, at 924-25. It is patently unjust that a mortgagee should be able to give a
discretionary advance with priority over a previously perfected fixture interest. In such a case,
the priority of the advance should be equated with the junior status of the underlying mortgage.
Section 9-3I3(4)(b) has been justly criticized by Professor Adams on this point.
See supra note 36.
" But see U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972).
Id. §§ 9-301(1), -307(2) (1962). Section 9-307(1), of course, is the all-important rule that
"buyer[s] in [the] ordinary course of business" of anything except farm products take free of even
perfected security interests, "even though the buyer knows of its existence." The statement about
buyers in the text ignores certain complexities, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-308 (purchasers of chattel paper
and instruments), heyond the scope of this article.
•" Id. § 9-301. See Review Committee, supra note 16, paras. E-46 to -47.
U.C.C. § 9-30I(c)-(d) (1972).
™ Again, this may be subject to the rule protecting secured parties who filed in the wrong
place from competitors with knowledge of the contents of the financing statement. Id. § 9401(2). See infra text aceompanying notes 150-60.
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prior to affixation. No ten day grace period exists under section 9313(4) (c).«"
With the fifth initiative, the drafters eliminated what they per
ceived to be a real estate owner's vulnerability to unscrupulous gen
eral contractors. Revised subsections 9-313(4)(a) and (b) protect the
secured party only where the debtor "has an interest of record" in the
real estate or has possession of the real estate. Under the old version of
the Code, commentators feared that a general contractor could buy
inventory subject to a supplier's security interest; it could even have
been the case that the supplier's security interest in the contractor's
inventory was unperfected. Since the security interest had attached
prior to affixation of the inventory to the real estate, the security
interest was senior to the interests of any prior real estate party. Thus
a real estate owner wishing to install new plumbing could have found
that the plumbing, once installed, was subject to a security interest for
a debt the real estate owner did not even owe.®' This danger may have
been somewhat exaggerated, since, under section 9-307(1), the real
estate owner who bought the plumbing would take it free of any
security interest created "by his seller" (i.e., the contractor), provided
that the sale had been in the ordinary course of the seller's business.®^
It is difficult to imagine many circumstances in which section 9-307(1)
would not have protected the real estate owner, but presumably, the
outside chance that this scenario could occur was enough to prompt
the drafting of some protection for the real estate owner in section 9313.®® Under the 1972 version, at least with regard to fixtures that are
not readily removable, office machines or consumer appliances, the
debtor must have "an interest of record in the real estate or [be] in
Of course, the grace period under section 9-313(4) (a) does apply to "readily removable"
collateral covered by section 9-313(4)(c), if the secured party chooses to file a fixture filing. The
interaction between these two sections will be developed in more detail below. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-19.
Kripke, Review Committee, supra note 1, at 311. See Review Committee, supra note 16,
para. A-14.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972). Any supplies in the possession of a general contractor would
seem to be covered by section 9-307(1), provided only that the contractor is a "person in the
business of selling goods of that kind" within the meaning of section 1-201(9); see also U.C.C. §
9-109(4) (1972) (goods are inventory "if they are . . . to be furnished under contracts of service or
if be has so furnished them"). If the contractor so qualifies, the owner of the real estate is a
"buyer in [the] ordinary course of business" within the meaning of section 9-307(1).
Professor Kripke considered and—on inadequate grounds—rejected the use of section 9307(1) to prevent contractor fraud. See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 70 ("[Tjbis line of
analysis probably will not work under the present Code, because a building contract is not a
contract for the sale of goods and, tbereforey the owner is not a buyer in the ordinary course
under Section 1-201(9); thus, the protection afforded by Section 9-307(1) does not apply."). A
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possession of the real estate" before the secured party can gain prior
ity.®^ Of course, the secured lender continues to have the option of
obtaining the real estate owner's consent to priority; subordination
agreements in such cases have always been expressly approved by the

ucc.®®

Unfortunately, the drafting job, intended to thwart unscrupulous
contractors, was less than complete. First, the debtor need not have
an interest in real estate in the case of collateral covered by section 9313(4)(c)—"readily removable" machines and appliances. Since these
items will tend to be a large percentage of fixture transactions, a
major loophole has been left. On the other hand, we may safely rely
on section 9-307(1) to destroy the supplier's security interest, so that
contractor's fraud is a most unlikely.
Second, the drafters overlooked the fact that the contractor will
often have a statutory lien to cover the supply of fixtures to an owner
of real estate.®® If so, the debtor (i.e., the contractor) will have an
"interest of record in real estate" (the statutory lien).®^ Section 9313(4) (a) makes clear that the fixture interest of the supplier takes
priority over the unwitting home owner whenever the contractor had
a recorded statutory lien. Again, section 9-307(1) renders this loophole
irrelevant or at least unimportant.

construction contract may well be outside the scope of Article 2, as Professor Kripke suggests, but
section 9-307(1) does not require Article 2 coverage of the sale. It requires only that the buyer be
in tbe ordinary course of business, which, through section 1-201(9), requires that the contractor
be a seller of "goods of that kind" (emphasis added). See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) (1972) (fixtures are
goods). Even if the basic terms of the construction contract do not fall under Article 2, it does not
follow that security interests on goods which become fixtures cannot be terminated under section
9-307(1). Tbis is especially so since application of section 9-307(1) serves tbe policy of preventing
contractor's fraud.
Nevertheless, authors have never used section 9-307(1) as the answer to contractor's fraud
and have assumed that it remained an important problem under the 1962 Code. See, e.g.,
Adams, supra note 1, at 866; Gordon, Credit Sales of Installed Equipment Financing—The
Uniform Commericial Code's Uneasy Truce Between Realty and Chattel Financing Interests, 64
Nw. U.L. Rev. 651, 670 (1970).
" U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)-(b) (1972).
« Id. §§ 9-313(5)(a), -316.
For example, in Texas, a statutory lien arises whenever a contractor supplies fixtures. The
lien arises at the time an agreement is recorded or work commences, whichever is earlier. Tex.
Civ. Code Ann. § 5459(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)-(b) (1972). The words "of record" will prevent the unfiled statutory
lien from sufficing for this theoretical contractor's fraud. Texas requires that a filing be made by
a contractor not later tban 120 days after tbe "indebtedness accrues." The lienor must notify the
debtor and must swear out an affidavit claiming the lien and the notice to the debtor. Id. § 5453.
Tex. Civ. Code Ann. § 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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The sixth initiative deals with automatic perfection without filing
for purchase money security interests in consumer goods. Under the
1962 Code, the automatic perfection rule for purchase money security
interests was unavailable for personal property which became fix
tures. These interests had to be perfected by a fixture filing.®® A
purchase money lender for consumer goods, therefore, faced the same
election dilemma as did his nonpurchase money brethren. In 1972 the
rule was changed.®® An automatically perfected interest in consumer
goods will survive affixation. This form of perfection is not good as
against all real estate parties, however, and there are circumstances in
which fixture filings are still required for priority.®®
The seventh initiative centered around the fact that assignment
of a mortgage could reverse the priority that the mortgage originally
had; junior mortgages could become senior in the hands of an assignee
who was ignorant of an intervening unperfected security interests®',
and senior mortages could become junior in the hands of an assignee
with knowledge of the intervening unperfected fixture interest (or an
assignee without knowledge, if the secured party simply perfected his
interest with a fixture filing).®^ This reversal of priorities occurred
because an assignee of a mortgage fit within the black letter of section
9-313(4) (a) of the 1962 Code as a "subsequent purchaser for value of
any interest in the real estate." This reversal is justifiable in the case of
a junior mortgage that is assigned and becomes senior in the hands of
the assignee. In such a case, the fixture lender will have failed to
perfect and therefore deserves his fate. Likewise, the case of a senior
mortgage, which becomes junior in the hands of an assignee is not
unfair (from the perspective of the assignee) because the assignee
could have protected himself by checking the records (where perfec
tion has occurred) or because the assignee took the mortgage in spite
of his knowledge of an unperfected fixture interest. The reversal was.

U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1962).
Id. § 9-302(l)(d) (1972).
Automatic perfection will suffice only when the secured party is able to claim priority
under section 9-313(4)(c) because his collateral is readily removable office machines or replace
ments for consumer appliances, or when the competing real estate claimant is a subsequent lien
creditor under section 9-313(4)(d).
" In such a case, the assignor's encumbrance could be junior either under old section 9313(2) (attachment-affixation cases) or under section 9-313(4) (a) or (c) (encumbrance taken or
advances made with knowledge of an unperfected security interest in fixtures).
In this case, the assignor's mortgage could be senior either under old section 9-313(3)
(affixation-attachment cases) or under section 9-313(4) (encumbrance subsequently created with
out the encumbrancer's knowledge of an unperfected security interest).
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however, unfair to the senior mortgagee. Although the mortgage
remained senior in the case where the mortgagee himself foreclosed,
the mortgage was less valuable in the mortgage resale market in light
of the reversal of priorities.®^ The 1962 version of section 9-313 thus
lacked a "shelter" concept, whereby a senior mortgagee could also
convey senior status to a prospective assignee, regardless of interven
ing perfection of the security interest or the assignee's knowledge.®^ In
contrast, the 1962 Code did provide a shelter provision to protect
assignees of fixture security interests.®®
The potential for senior mortgages to be subordinated to fixture
interests upon assignment has been obviated by a change in the lan
guage of 9-313(4)(b) which gives the secured party priority over subse
quent purchasers only when "the security interest has priority over
any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer
or owner." This language incorporates the "shelter" concept that the
1962 version clearly lacked.®®

Marketability of mortgage debt takes on added significance in light of the active trading
which has arisen in recent years in "Ginnie Maes (mortgage-backed bonds guaranteed by the
Government National Mortgage Association) and other securities. See, e.g., Note, Security
Interests in Notes and Mortgages; Determining the Applicable Law, 79 Golum. L. Rev. 1414,
1415 (1979).
Cf. U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (1972) (shelter provision for holders of negotiable instruments).
Id. § 9-302(2) (1962).
The 1972 amendments prevent the deterioration of a mortgage's priority because of
assignment, but they do not necessarily eliminate the possibility that a (potentially) junior
mortgage could become senior as a result of an assignment. Under section 9-313(4) (a) of the 1972
Code, a mortgage is potentially junior for 10 days after affixation. If a fixture filing is made
within these 10 days, the mortgage becomes permanently junior, and there is no way this status
could be changed by assignment. But if the potentially junior mortgage is assigned before
perfection during the 10 days following affixation, it becomes senior in the hands of the assignee,
provided the assignee records his new interest before a fixture filing is made. If the assignee of the
mortgage does file first, he is "of record" prior to perfection of the security interest within the
meaning of section 9-313(4) (b). Roughly speaking, this establishes a grace period similar to that
in section 9-301(2), where lien creditors and bulk purchasers are made subject to the grace
period, but other kinds of buyers are not, U.G.C. § 9-301(l)(c)-(d) (1972).
The "no-shelter" idea when the mortgage is potentially junior under section 9-313(4)(a) is
not analogous to section 9-301(2) in this regard; If a lien creditor were to assign his lien during
the grace period, the assignee would also be subject to the grace period, because the assignee's
rights would "arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing." Id. § 9301(2). But under section 9-313(4)(a), the encumbrancer's rights must arise "before" affixation of
the collateral. Assignees who take their rights between affixation and the filing seem to be
covered only by section 9-313(4)(b), where they have a chance to improve the position held by
the assignor, who was potentially junior.
Another curiosity with regard to assigned real estate interests is the assigned judicial lien.
These liens are covered by section 9-313(4)(a). If they arise before affixation of the collateral they
can be defeated only by a fixture filing within 10 days of affixation. If such a lien were to be
assigned during the grace period, the lien's priority would be governed not by section 9-
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The eighth initiative in the 1972 amendments is not really a
change in the law, but is more in the nature of a clarification which
the drafters thought important enough to emphasize with some ex
plicit statutory language.®^ This final initiative relates to "trade fix
tures," a term of art referring to fixtures installed by tenants, typically
to equip their places of business. For example, stools in a diner might
qualify as fixtures in some states because they are bolted or cemented
to the floor. The law of most states, however, is that "trade fixtures"
are presumptively removable by the tenant.®® At the end of the lease
term, the tenant, not the landlord, keeps the stools.®®
Under the 1962 Code the landlord never had an interest in this
type of fixture. When the landlord sold his reversionary interest in the

313(4)(b), which contains the shelter provision described in tbe text, but by section 9-313(4)(d).
Under section 9-313(4)(d), a subsequent lien creditor can be beaten by any sort of UCC
perfection, including automatic perfection of purchase money security interests in consumer
goods. Thus, if no shelter provision exists in section 9-313(4)(d), the assignee of a judicial lien has
a special vulnerability tbat assignees of mortgages do not bave.
There is a way to construct a shelter idea out of section 9-313(4)(d). That provision governs
liens "obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected." A lien
obtained by assignment is therefore not covered by section 9-313(4) (d). A court is thus free to
decide the lien assignee's priority under section 9-313(4){a), where a fixture filing within 10 days
of affixation is required for the secured party to prevail.
" See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-15.
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1019 (West 1982); Van Ness v. Packard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137
(1829); see also Poole's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 320 (K.H. 1703). See generally Note, Trade Fixture—
Secured Transactions Under New York's Uniform Commercial Code, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 165 (1979).
Of course, the landlord may obtain a statutory lien for rent on the debtor's personal
property, and the priority of this lien is another question altogether. Section 9-104(b) states that a
landlord's lien for rent is not governed by Article 9, and some courts have interpreted this to
mean that pre-UCC nonuniform law might give absolute priority to the landlord. See, e.g.. In re
Einhorn Bros., 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff d, 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959). If pre-UCC
law is used, sometimes the landlord takes priority over conflicting UCC security interests and
sometimes he does not. See Johnson, The Landlord's Lien, the Conditional Sales Contract, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Ala. Law. 395 (1968); Leary & Rucci, supra note 1, at 38889; Lee, Liens on Personal Property Not Governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 N.
C.L. Rev. 322, 351-55 (1966). Also, some courts have ruled that landlord's liens obtain the
superpriority of section 9-310, while others have held that landlords obtain only the lien creditor
priority under section 9-301. These matters, as well as Alabama's recent nonuniform legislation
on the priority of landlord's liens, are expertly handled in Comment, Amendment to Section 9310 of the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code; Priorities Between an Article 9 Security Interest
and a Statutory Landlord's Lien, 13 Cum. L. Rev. 97 (1982).
Charles Dickens had cause to consider the priority between a landlord's lien for rent and a
conditional vendor's security interest in the tenant's personal property. He would have favored
the rule of section 9-313(5)(b) even in spite of the presence of a landlord's lien. C. Dickens, Bleak
House, ch. 18 (" 'The oddity of the thing is', said Mr. Skimpole with a quickened sense of the
ludicrous, 'that my chairs and tables were not paid for, and yet my landlord walks off with them
as composedly as possible. Now, tbat seems drolll There's something grotesque in it. The chair
and table merchant never engaged to pay my landlord my rent. Why should my landlord quarrel
with him?' ").
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premises, or when they were seized by his creditor, the purchaser or
lien creditor never obtained the trade fixtures.'"" It was, therefore,
impossible for such real estate parties to take priority over the tenant's
creditor who had a security interest in the trade fixtures. The Review
Committee apparently thought that the danger of some court missing
this point was sufficiently great that it specifically added section 9313(5) (b). Under this subsection, the secured party has priority over
the landlord or the landlord's assignees, whether or not the security
interest has been perfected. This provision is not an exception to the
mandate of section 9-313(4) (a)—that prior real estate interests cannot
be subordinated to unperfected security interests. Rather, it is simply
a restatement of the obvious principle that the landlord has no interest
whatsoever in trade fixtures and thus perfection, as to him, is irrele
vant.'"'
Another theme might be mentioned which cannot properly be
termed an "initiative" since it is not clear whether the reform was
intended or not. The 1972 amendments solve the riddle posed by an
unperfected real estate mortgage. Under the 1962 Code, an earlier
unrecorded mortgage might still have prevailed over a security inter
est in an "affixation-then-attachment" case.'"^ On the other hand, an

"In considering fixture priority problems, there will always first be a preliminary question
whether real estate interests per se have an interest in the goods as part of the real estate. If not, it
is immaterial, so far as concerns the real estate parties, as such, whether a chattel security
interest is perfected or unperfected." Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-6.
"" It is not inevitable that the tenant may remove trade fixtures at the end of the term. In
Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Berry, 601 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), the landlord
leased land to a tenant on the condition that any fixtures added by the tenant became the
landlord's property after the lease terminated. A signmaker "leased" some signs to the tenant
who affixed them to the land. As so often happens, the signmaker found himself to be an
unperfected secured party, not a lessor. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972). Since the secured party
made no filing, let alone a fixture filing, the landlord's "after-acquired property" interest took
priority over the security interest. Section 9-313(5) (b) was of no avail to the unperfected secured
party here.
It should be noted that the stated rationale of the court in Berry is quite different from the
above analysis. The court reasoned that the unperfected security interest had been foreclosed
when the landlord sued to foreclose his statutory lien against the tenant's personal property. This
analysis is demonstrably wrong. A Texas landlord does indeed have a lien on a tenant's personal
property to secure payment of rent, but here the landlord's interest was a consensual grant by the
tenant, not a statutory lien. The landlord was not enforcing a statutory lien but was merely
seeking a "judgment for restitution of the premises" after termination of the lease. See Tex. Civ.
Proc. Rules Ann. R. 748, 751-55 (Vernon 1979). The better analysis is that the landlord was a
senior real estate claimant because the secured party failed to make a fixture filing within 10 days
of affixation, as required by section 9-313(4)(a).
Adams, supra note 1, at 902. The only reference in the 1962 version of section 9-313(4) to
recordation of the real estate interest was that a future advance was entitled to priority over an
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Article 9 fixture lender seemed to qualify as a subsequent bona fide
purchaser of real estate under most recording statutes. These were
competing priority schemes, each awarding priority to different par
ties. A choice between the conflicting systems might therefore have
been required under the 1962 version. The 1972 amendments solve the
conundrum. Under section 9-313(4)(b), a secured party who perfects
before a mortgage is "of record" always prevails. Today there is a pure
race between mortgagees and secured parties to record or perfect their
respective claims.
III. Priorities Under the 1972 Amendments
The structure of section 9-313 today is such that secured parties
lose automatically unless they can find a rule that supports their
priority under subsection (4).^°® Even if they do find such a rule,
secured parties may still lose if the real estate claimant against whom
they are competing is a construction mortgagee (or his assignee) and
construction is going on at the time of affixation.'"^
For purposes of comparison with the 1962 Code, it will again be
helpful to examine the priorities that arise from the six possible pat
terns of temporal order between attachment, affixation and accrual of
the real estate interest (which, for convenience, will again be provi
sionally identified as a mortgage).
A. Case One: Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation Under
Sections 9-313(4)(a)-(c)
This first case, so simple under the 1962 version of the Code, has
now become monstrously complex. The basic structure of the relevant
priority sections is such that section 9-313(4) (a) might be available,

intervening unperfected security interest only when the underlying mortgage was "of record."
The purpose of this reference was less than clear, and perhaps echoed some mortgage cases which
denied priority to future advances if the mortgage was unrecorded. See G. Osborne, supra note
36, § 119, at 192-94. Ironically, those cases denied priority to the future advance because the
original mortgage itself was denied priority. Under section 9-313(4) (c) of the 1962 Code, how
ever, the future advance was denied priority for lack of recordation even though the original
unrecorded mortgage had priority over the fixture interest under section 9-313(4) (3) (affixationattachment cases) or under section 9-313(4)(a).
'0^ See U.C.C. § 9-313(7) (1972). Of course, under subsection (5)(b), the secured party wins if
the fixtures are trade fixtures in which the competing landlord has no interest. U.C.C. § 9313(5) (b) (1972). This is not, strictly speaking, a priority contest, but merely a restatement of the
obvious principle that the secured party always wins where the landlord has no interest at all to
claim. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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irrespective of the nature of the collateral, or, if the collateral is
"readily removable" and is within a narrow category of "machines"
and appliances, section 9-313(4)(c) may also be used.'"® Section 9313(4)(b) is also available when the mortgage is unrecorded.
Section 9-313(4) (a) is unique in that it requires the secured party
to have purchase money status. The 1962 Code never required it, and
neither does any other subsection of current section 9-313. In addition
to having purchase money status, a secured party relying upon section
9-313(4) (a) must perfect against the prior mortgagee (a major change
from the 1962 law),'"® and perfection can only be achieved by a
fixture filing.'"''

If these sections are inapplicable, the secured party can also have priority under section 9313(4)(b) if he perfects his security interest before the mortgage is recorded.
See supra note 23 and text accompanying notes 15-17. Professor Adams saw in the lack of a
perfection requirement a threat to the validity of the earlier real estate mortgage. He reasoned
that the unperfected security interest was voidable in the debtor's bankruptcy, where the trustee,
was given the status of a hypothetical lien creditor on the day that the bankruptcy petition was
filed. 1898 Act § 70(c). Once avoided, the trustee could save the lien for the benefit of the estate
and capture from the real estate mortgagee the senior priority of the UCC secured party, to the
extent of the secured party's lien. Id. § 60(b). This much of the analysis is undeniable. Professor
Adams suggests, however, that the trustee could subrogate himself to the secured party's rights
under section 70(e) as well. Under the holding of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), the trustee
could then have avoided the entire real estate mortgage, not merely the amount equivalent of the
secured party's prior lien. Adams, supra note I, at 868-69.
This theory seems to have a sound basis in the case law. E.g., Electric Constructors, Inc., v.
Azar, 405 F.2d 475, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1968) (trustee could subrogate himself to a statutory lien
creditor's rights and defeat a junior security interest). See also 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 45.3,
at 1293-94; Googan, supra note 7, at 1338-39. But the idea that section 70(e) allowed subroga
tion to lien rights seems dubious, in that it swallows whole the concept that avoided liens are
preserved for the benefit of the bankrupt estate. Preservation of liens for the benefit of a
bankrupt's estate prevents a windfall to junior secured parties who otherwise would benefit from
the avoidance of a senior lien hy the trustee. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Gong., 2d Sess. 90,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 5787, 5876. If junior liens were always void
because the trustee could subrogate himself to senior liens and destroy the entire junior lien under
Moore v. Bay, there would be no room for the lien preservation concept to work.
It should also be noted that Professor Adams' theory of Moore v. Bay, in no way depends
upon the avoidance of a senior security interest. Presumably the trustee could subrogate himself
to any senior interest and could thereby eliminate any junior lien or mortgage from the picture.
Fortunately, we will have no further opportunity to explore this thesis. The newly enacted
BRA limits the trustee's subrogation power to the rights of unsecured creditors only. 11 U.S.G. §
544(b)(Supp. V 1981).
"" An ordinary UGG filing will not do, even if we substitute a prior lien creditor for a prior
mortgagee. This is indeed a pretty piece of nonsense, since a subsequent lien creditor can be
beaten by an ordinary UGG filing or (if the fixtures are consumer goods) by no filing at all. Why
there are different perfection requirements for prior and subsequent lien creditors has no logical
answer, but there may be a literary answer. The subsequent lien creditor was equated with the
bankruptcy trustee. With that in mind, section 9-313(4)(d) was drafted with great care. But as
for prior lien creditors, who have no bankruptcy significance, the drafters were indifferent and
were content to lump them in with other prior encumbrancers.
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While a secured party who relies upon section 9-313(4) (a) for
priority must meet these rigorous perfection requirements, at least he
receives the benefit of a ten-day grace period. The grace period com
mences when the collateral is affixed to the real estate. This is differ
ent from the usual purchase money grace period found elsewhere in
the UCC, which begins to run when the debtor "receives possession"
of the collateral. 10® Since receipt of possession is a logical prerequisite
for affixation of the collateral to the debtor's real estate, it is possible,
and perhaps common, for the grace period under section 9-313(4)(a)
to be longer than the other grace periods for purchase money interests.
More problematic for the fixture lender is the fact that the grace
period granted by section 9-3I3(4)(a) is quite different from that given
under federal bankruptcy law. Section 547(e) of the BRA presents
considerable danger for the purchase money fixture lender who thinks
he can rely on the grace period under section 9-313(4)(a).
In order to sabotage any "secret liens," the preference statute has
always deemed a transfer to occur when it is perfected against lien
creditors or purchasers of real property. But a grace period has always
been granted to avoid changing contemporaneously exchanged secur
ity interests into transfers in satisfaction of antecedent debt where
there are only small gaps between attachment and perfection of those
interests.!"® Section 547(e) was therefore designed to give the secured
party ten days to perfect his interest after it has attached. If the grace
period has been met, the transfer is deemed to have occurred at the
time of attachment. This transfer, if before the start of the preference
period or if given in exchange for new value, is saved from avoidance;
the transaction is either too early to be a voidable preference or is a
contemporaneous exchange. If the grace period is not met, the trans
fer is deemed to have occurred at the time of perfection, long after
value has been given by the creditors. This transaction is considered to
be in satisfaction of antecedent debt and is potentially voidable.
Since affixation often occurs at a time different from attachment,
a creditor relying solely on section 9-313(4) (a) for guidance as to when
to perfect may find his security interest void if his debtor is bankrupt
within ninety days of affixation. He may also lose his opportunity to
prevail under section 547(c)(3). This section states that even if a

U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), -312(4) (1972).
Section 60(a)(7) of the 1898 Act provided a 21-day grace period. Unlike section 547(e),
section 60(a)(7) was available only in cases where new value was given. See generally Breitowitz,
supra note 59, at 388-408.
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purchase money security interest is otherwise deemed a transfer in
satisfaction of antecedent debt under section 547(e), it is immune from
avoidance if the security interest is perfected within the ten-day grace
period of 547(c)(3).This ten-day grace period also commences at
attachment. A financing statement filed within the grace period of
section 9-313(4)(a), therefore, may not protect the purchase money
fixture lender from the bankruptcy trustee.'"
A secured party who has not made a fixture filing within the
grace period of section 9-313(4)(a) may have another opportunity to
prevail if his collateral is of the type covered by section 9-313(4)(c). In
order to qualify for the liberal filing rules of this section ("the security
interest is perfected by any method permitted by the Article"), the
collateral must be "readily removable factory or office machines or
readily removable replacements of domestic appliances which are
consumer goods.
It is not clear how rigorously the restrictions on the types of
collateral covered by section 9-313(4)(c) are, meant to apply. For
example, consider again the case of the bar stools which are collateral
for an Article 9 security interest. These stools may be "equipment"
within the meaning of section 9-109 because they are used in busi
ness,"^ but they do not seem to be "machines," even though they are
"readily removable." Hence, nonmechanical equipment does not fall
under section 9-313(4)(c).'"

"» Section 547(c)(3) was written to save the enabling loan from destruction. When a bank
lends purchase money, the security interest it will later receive will almost certainly be a transfer
on account of antecedent debt. Section 547(c)(3) sets forth the elements of purchase money
status, but requires that perfection of the security interest occur within 10 days of attachment.
See id. at 425-29.
, r.
t.i. •
j
The converse circumstance also poses a bankruptcy risk: where the fixture filing is made
before affixation of the collateral. Such a fixture filing is ineffective with regard to unaffixed
collateral and only becomes effective upon eventual affixation. See supra text accompanying note
68. If affixation is within 10 days of attachment, then the fixture filing becomes effective
perfection, and section 547(e)(2)(A) deems the transfer to be made at the time of attachment If
affixation is beyond the 10-day grace period, the transfer is deemed to be the time of affixation.
In the latter case, delayed affixation turns an otherwise contemporaneous transfer into a transfer
on account of antecedent debt. This proves yet again that the Review Committee has failed to
remedy completely the mutually exclusive filing hazard that existed under the 1962 version of
section 9-313. See supra text accompanying note 68.
"2 u.c.c. § 9-313(4)(c) (1972).
.
. u •
"Goods are ... (2) 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use primarily in busi
ness

"Id. §9-109.
Coogan has criticized the choice of words in section 9-313(4)(c) and would have preferred
that the term "equipment" had been used. Coogan, supra note 16, at 486-90.
Professor Adams, who also finds section 9-313(4)(c) to be imprecise, raises a hypothetical
question of a landlord who furnishes his apartment with encumbered air conditioners. Professor
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The applicability of section 9-313(4) (c) to consumer goods is
limited to those which are replacements. This rule was designed to
give mortgagees (and all others except subsequent lien creditors) prior
ity over secured parties with security interests in original appliances in
new dwellings.''® Thereafter, replacements are eligible for Article 9
financing."® The emphasis on replacements creates strange results in
some circumstances—for example, where a homeowner buys a dish
washer on credit subject to a purchase money security interest and
installs it in a way that it becomes a fixture under the common law of
the state. The applicability of 9-313(4) (c) will depend on whether or
not the dishwasher is the first one the homeowner has bought. Also, if
the homeowner has bought an additional dishwasher, it is not a
"replacement," and section 9-313(4)(c) is not applicable.
If a secured party can succeed in convincing a court that his
collateral is readily removable machinery or replacements of con
sumer goods, he will be excused from many of the rigors of section 93I3(4)(a). He need not have technical purchase money status, he need
not perfect with a fixture filing, and he can take priority over con
struction mortgagees."^ On the down side, there is no grace period,
perfection must be prior to affixation, and in the case of consumer
goods, automatic perfection can be had only if the lender has purchase
money status."®
Why the grace period of section 9-313(4) (a) is denied to a secured
party under section 9-3I3(4)(c) is not apparent."® Nor is it clear why
7

Adams argues that these air conditioners are consumer goods and are therefore covered only to
the extent they are replacements of previous consumer goods. Adams, supra note 1, at 912. I
would take issue with this analysis, since the landlord is not using the air conditioners for his own
personal use. To the landlord, they are equipment. But, significantly, they are not office or
factory.equipment and hence not covered by section 9-313(4)(c) at all. Accord Review Commit
tee, supra note 16, para. A-10. Only perfection under section 9-313(4)(a) (which requires a
fixture filing) is possible, and the secured party must have purchase money status as well.
U.C.Q, § 9-313 comment 4(d) (1972). If the collateral is an original consumer appliance, a
fixture filing will be required to beat all earlier real estate claimants, including lien creditors. Id.
§ 9-313(4) (b). That leaves subsequent lien creditors as the only competing real estate claimants
who, under section 9-313(4)(d), can be beaten by ordinary UCC perfection.
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-10.
U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972). Thus, even if the funds from the construction mortgagee are
used to buy the collateral, the debtor may turn around and use this as collateral for a second
loan. The secured party will prevail under section 9-313(4)(c), which does not require purchase
money status.
Id. § 9-302(l)(d).
According to Professor Kripke, early proposals for grace periods against subsequent real
estate owners and encumbrancers were staunchly opposed by the real estate industry. Kripke,
Review Committee, supra note 1, at 308. Since section 9-313(4)(c) applies equally to subsequent
and prior real estate interests, the failure to provide a grace period against prior interests may
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purchase money status is strictly required under section 9-313(4)(a),
but not section 9-313(4) (c). It is this sort of asymmetry which makes
section 9-313(4) perhaps the most baroque of the UCC provisions.
Finally, the secured party who has not perfected by the deadlines
in sections 9-313(4)(a) or (c) can still win under section 9-313(4)(b) if
the mortgage is unrecorded and the secured party is the first to perfect
with a fixture filing. Even if the collateral is one of the "readily
removable" items within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (c), a fixture
filing will be required against an unrecorded mortgage whenever
ordinary UCC perfection has not occurred before affixation. This
seems less peculiar than some of the contrasts we have seen. It is only
sporting that the mortgagee and the secured party race to the very
same finishing line—the mortgage recording office. In addition, the
secured party with section 9-313(4)(c) collateral who has missed his
deadline for ordinary UCC perfection and who is without a fixture
filing is vulnerable to subsequent mortgagees; it therefore seems just
that he likewise be vulnerable to a mortgagee who recorded late.'^"
Treating these two types of mortgagees equally will prevent the se
cured party from trying to claim that a truly subsequent mortgage is
really a subsequently recorded earlier mortgage subject to an opposite
rule. Priority cases will therefore be easily decided by the order of
recordation in the real estate records.
B. Case Two: Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment
and Section 9-313(4)(a)
Under the 1962 Code, section 9-313(3) accorded priority to the
prior mortgagee in the "affixation-then-attachment" case. The rule
has not changed greatly under the 1972 amendments, although in one
exceedingly narrow circumstance the secured party can prevail over a
prior mortgagee.
Where a prior mortgagee has promptly recorded'^^ his mortgage,
section 9-313(4)(a) provides the only method by which the secured

stem from this opposition, in which case perhaps the Review Committee drafted too broadly in
deference to the views of the real estate bar. That is, section 9-313(4)(c) could have provided that
subsequent real estate claimants lost even if perfection were after affixation, as long as perfection
occurred before a competing real estate claimant recorded his interest.
I question whether secured parties who miss their deadline under section 9-313(4)(c)
should still be required to make a fixture filing to beat subsequent mortgages. If that criticism is
well taken, then the point in the text also should be reversed. See supra note 119.
If the mortgagee fails to record, the secured party can always prevail by perfecting first
with a fixture filing pursuant to section 9-313(4)(b).
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party in an "affixation-then-attachment" case can prevail, but only
under the most unusual of circumstances. In order to have priority
under section 9-313(4) (a) the secured party must have purchase
money status and must make a fixture filing within ten days of affix
ation. This is theoretically possible. Suppose that a merchant sells a
dishwasher to the debtor on credit subject to a purchase money secur
ity agreement. The parties orally agree to the security interest but
neglect to place their signatures on a written agreement that comports
with the requirements of section 9-203(1)(a).'" The debtor takes the
dishwasher home and affixes it to his real estate, which is subject to a
mortgage with an after-acquired property clause encompassing fix
tures. On the day after affixation, the seller realizes his mistake and
rushes to the debtor's home for his signature. When the debtor signs,
the security interest has now attached one day after affixation.The
secured party then files a fixture filing within ten days after affixation.
This scenario is just about the only one in which a secured party will
have the opportunity for priority in an "affixation-then-attachment"
case under section 9-313(4)(a). If that section offers little hope, section
9-313(4)(c) provides none at all, even if the dishwasher is a replace
ment. Here, attachment must precede affixation because section 9-

'22 The exact words of section 9-313(4)(a) provide that the secured party must perfect within
10 days of affixation. Mere filing is not enough. Since perfection presupposes attachment,
U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972), it must also be true that all the elements of attachment, U.C.C. § 9203 (1972) (signed security agreement, debtor gets rights in collateral, and creditor gives value),
must also take place within the 10-day period.
'22 Section 9-203(1) (a) provides that
a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third party with respect to
the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which con
tains a description of the collateral ....
'2'' Delayed signature of the security agreement is not unknown in fixture cases. See Honea v.
Laco Auto Leasing, Inc., 454 P.2d 782 (N.M. App. 1969). That case, decided under the 1962
Code, held that attachment occurred as soon as the parties orally agreed upon a security
agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962). Cf. id. § 9-203(1) (nonpossessory security interest "not
enforceable" until the debtor has signed the security agreement). Under the 1972 amendments,
attachment cannot occur before the debtor's signature is on the agreement, id. § 9203(l)(a)(1972), and thus, the Honea case would have been an "affixation-attachment" case, if
the 1972 amendments had governed. Hence, both attachment and the fixture filing would have
been required within 10 days of affixation in order for the secuired party to prevail. Id. § 9313(4)(a).
In Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct.
1970), the debtor signed after affixation. The court, construing the 1962 Code, stated that
attachment was after affixation. But this assumes that the debtor and the secured party had not
agreed upon a security interest orally before affixation, a possible but most unlikely circum
stance.
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313(4) (c) requires that perfection precede affixation; under section 9303(1) there cannot be perfection until attachment has occurred.*^®
Once again it appears that a relatively straightforward provision
from the 1962 Code—section 9-313(2)—has been transformed into a
curious puzzle in the "affixation-then-attachment" cases. The secured
party can prevail over earlier real estate interests in only the most
unusual of cases.
C. Cases Three and Four: Attachment-Mortgage-Affixation
and Affixation-Mortgage-Attachment
Under the 1962 Code, the priorities in an "attachment-mortgageaffixation" case were the same as those where the sequence was "mort
gage-attachment-affixation."Section 9-313(2) clearly applied in
both situations. Similarly, section 9-313(3) governed both "mortgageaffixation-attachment" and "affixation-mortgage-attachment."
This symmetry has been destroyed by the 1972 amendments.
The 1972 Code continues to treat the cases of "attachment-mort
gage-affixation" and "mortgage-attachment-affixation" in the same
manner. In either situation the secured party can prevail under sec
tion 9-313(4) (a) if he has purchase money status and has perfected by
a fixture filing within ten days of affixation. If the competing real
estate claimant has failed to record his interest, priority under section
9-313(4) (b) is also possible whenever the secured party is the first to
file. Finally, a secured party may gain priority under section 9313(4)(c) if his collateral qualifies and if he perfects (by any method)
prior to affixation.
Since 1972, the "mortgage-affixation-attachment" case has been
treated differently from the "affixation-mortgage-attachment" case.
As was demonstrated in "case two," where the mortgage preceded
affixation and attachment, the secured party had a remote possibility
for priority under section 9-313(4)(a). If, however, the sequence is
"affixation-mortgage-attachment," the secured party cannot avail
himself of this section. This is because section 9-313(4) (a) requires that
"the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arise before the goods

Note that section 9-313(4)(a) has no such requirement. Therefore, the security interest in
the dishwasher referred to in the text can be senior only under section 9-313(4)(a), even if the
dishwasher is a consumer replacement within the meaning of section 9-313(4)(c).
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See id.
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become fixtures." Thus, when the mortgage follows affixation, all
chances for financing preaffixed collateral with priority over the
mortgagee disappear, except when a mortgage is unrecorded and
where attachment of the security interest and its perfection hy a
fixture filing are achieved before mortgage recordation. In such a
case, the secured party wins under section 9-313(4) (h).
D. Cases Five and Six: Subsequent Mortgages
Before the 1972 amendments, section 9-313(4) alone governed
the subsequent mortgagee's priority, and "subsequent" meant subse
quent to both attachment and affixation.Today, three subsections
can conceivably govern the priority of a subsequent real estate inter
est. Only subsection (a) of section 9-313(4) (1972) requires that "the
interest of the encumbrancer or owner arise[] before the goods become
fixtures." Therefore, any of the other subsections can aid the secured
party in gaining priority. Since section 9-313(4)(a) is inapplicable, the
secured party does not need purchase money status in order to prevail
unless he wishes to rely on automatic perfection of an interest in
consumer goods.
Section 9-313(4) (c) is available to the secured party where there is
a subsequent mortgage. Of course, the nature of the collateral is
crucial. If it qualifies as readily removable office or factory machines
or replacements of consumer goods, the secured party can prevail if he
perfects, by any means, prior to affixation.
If the secured party's collateral does not meet the requirements of
section 9-313(4) (c) or if he does not meet section 9-313(4) (c)'s merciless
deadline for an ordinary UCC filing, his only hope for priority over
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees is to proceed under section 9313(4)(b). Under this section, there must be perfection by a fixture
filing before the interest of the mortgagee is recorded. This section
reduces the contest between the mortgagee and the secured party to a
pure race to file in the real estate records.

See id.
"i® Purehase money status for this purpose is required under section 9-302(1) (d) of the 1972
Code. Ordinarily, one would expect purchase money status to be helpful only against afteraequired property interests that were filed earlier in time. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3),-(4) (1972). But
here is one circumstance where purchase money status is necessary to beat subsequently created
interests.
Even if the secured party wins the race, he may lose if his filing is not deemed to meet the
requirements of 9-313(l)(b). E.g., Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d
949 (1979) (filing not sufficient because it contained no description of real property).
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One may fairly question the deadline in section 9-313(4) (c) for
ordinary UCC perfection as applied to truly subsequent mortga
gees.'^' The whole premise of section 9-313(4)(c) is that the collateral
covered therein is not typically expected to be part of the real estate
available to mortgagees or purchasers and that therefore a fixture
filing need not be required.With regard to earlier mortgages, the
rule of "first in time is first in right" dictates that the deadline be
imposed (and even here the Review Committee should have made a
purchase money exception).'" No such justification exists for subse
quent mortgages, however.''^ If they truly do not expect to find real
estate recordations on readily removable office machines and con
sumer appliances, there seems little reason to require a fixture filing in
cases where the secured party has not met his section 9-313(4) (c)
deadline."''
It is curious that the treatment of prior and subsequent mortgagees and purchasers under
section 9-313(4) is so drastically different. As to mortgagees and purchasers earlier in time, a
grace period is given to purchase money security interests. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1972). No grace
period exists when these same parties are subsequent. Thus, if collateral is affixed on Tuesday, a
Monday purchaser of real estate is burdened by a grace period, while a Wednesday purchaser is
not. The difference can be explained by the fact that the Wednesday purchaser relies on the state
of the record and is entitled to proteetion. The Monday purchaser does not rely on the state of the
record and does not purport to buy unaffixed personal property. As to him a grace period seems
more acceptable.
. ,
Under section 9-301, a distinction is made between lien creditors (subject to a grace period
in purchase money cases) and buyers (who are not burdened by a grace period). But this
distinction is entirely different in kind from what 1 have said about prior and subsequent real
estate claimants. Under section 9-301(2), neither the lien creditor nor purchaser can be prior in
time to the purchase money security interest, which arises instantaneously upon the debtor
obtaining rights in the collateral. Under section 9-313 this temporal factor is all-important
Encumbrancers, at least, can have an interest in the underlying real estate before collateral is
affixed And under the fixture statute, no distinction is made between buyers and encumbrancers
(except subsequent lien creditors, who are treated differently) whereas the distinction between
lien creditors and buyers under section 9-301 is fundamental.
132 "The Committee considers that factory and office machines are not always financed as part
of a consturction mortgage, and that it is reasonable to expeet the mortgagee to be alert to
conflicting chattel financing of these machines." Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A 9.
In other words, when collateral is affixed to real estate before a security interest is
perfected, the earlier recorded mortgage lien will have already attached. When the mortgage
attaches, it comes into competition with an unperfected security interest. The rule of "first m
time is first in right" therefore supports priority for the mortgagee. A purchase money security
interest could be given a grace period here without much harm to the mortgage industry, and
such a rule would make section 9-313(4)(c) consistent with similar grace periods given against
lien creditors and other secured parties. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), -312(4) (1972).
134 when the mortgage arises subsequent to affixation and perfection of the security interest,
the mortgage attaches to the collateral at a time when the security interest is already perfected.
The rule of "first in time is first in right" cannot therefore apply to truly subsequent mortgag^.
Nor can it apply to unrecorded mortgages which are recorded after collateral is affixed and the
security interest is perfected. Under the eurrent statute, earlier mortgages which are subse
quently recorded can only be defeated by a fixture filing under section 9-313(4) (b).
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The secured party has an additional opportunity to prevail when
a lien creditor is substituted for a mortgagee: section 9-313(4) (d) gives
the secured party priority when he has perfected by any manner
before the creditor obtains the lien "by legal or equitable proceed
ings.""®
Under the 1962 Code, all lien creditors, whether "prior" or "sub
sequent" to the security interest, were treated similarly to prior or
subsequent mortgages. Section 9-3I3(4)(d) was included in the 1972
amendments in an attempt to protect the fixture lender from the
bankruptcy trustee, but the measure of protection is diminished by an
ambiguity as to timing. The statute makes clear that the lien itself
must be "obtained" after perfection has occurred. What is left unclear
is whether the judicial or equitable proceedings giving rise to the lien
must also be subsequent to perfection. It is contended that the timing
of the judical proceedings should be irrelevant.
By way of illustration, consider a situation where ordinary con
sumer goods are subjected to an automatically perfected purchase
money security interest, but are not yet affixed to the debtor's real
estate. At the point they are affixed and thereby transformed into real
estate, a lien creditor will have "obtained" a lien on the fixtures, but
not before."® The judgment lien on consumer goods, therefore, should
be deemed "subsequent" within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (d),
and no further action on the part of the secured party would be
necessary to defeat the lien creditor. If, however, the lien were held
not to be subsequent, because the judicial proceedings which gave rise
to it antedated perfection, it would have to be treated as a prior lien
under section 9-313(4)(a). Such a lien can be subordinated only by a
fixture filing.
The proper reading of section 9-313(4) (d) is that a security inter
est that is perfected before affixation will take priority over a judicial
lien which is in place on the underlying real estate at the time of
affixation. A fixture filing under section 9-313(4)(a) should not be
required in such a case.
A final observation is that subsequent lien creditors may theoreti
cally be subordinated under sections 9-313(4) (b) and (c), but section 9-

The exact language of section 9-313(4) (b) is such that the secured party prevails when "the
security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer ... is of
record." A lien on real estate generally does not arise until the judgment has been docketed
within the county where the real estate is located. It is at that point that the judgment lien is "of
record" within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (b).
In re Darwin, 117 F. 407 (6th Cir. 1902).
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313(4) (d) subsumes these sections with more liberal perfection re
quirements. Section 9-313(4)(b) requires a fixture filing before the lien
is of record, whereas section 9-313(4) (c) requires perfection before
affixation. Under section 9-313(4)(d), the secured party can perfect
after affixation, so long as he perfects before the judgment lien on the
fixtures is obtained.
IV. Priorities Between Two Security Interests in the Same Fixture
Section 9-313 presupposes a priority battle between a classic real
estate claimant—such as an owner or mortgagee—and an Article 9
secured party. The section does not seem to govern priorities between
competing secured parties who both claim a fixture. Not a first glance
anyway.
White and Summers have thought about and disposed of the
priorities between fixture lenders with admirable succinctness. They
conclude, "presumably neither party holds an encumbrance as that
term is defined in 9-105(l)(g). Their relative priority, if determined at
all under Article 9[,] will be settled by 9-312."'^^ Their analysis de
pends first on the assumption that section 9-312 easily solves the
priority problems, and second on the supposition that a fixture interest
under Article 9 is not an "encumbrance."
In fact, section 9-312, as applied to fixture interests under the
1962 Code, was not so easy to apply. Let us compare the typical case
of a purchase money secured party versus a lender with a security
interest in after-acquired property, where both security interests have
attached to the collateral before it is affixed to the real estate."® Under
section 9-312(4), the purchase money lender won if he perfected his
interest before the end of his ten-day grace period, which started to
run when the debtor received possession of the collateral. But once the
collateral became a fixture, the UCC filings were no longer adequate
to perfect the interests in fixtures. Both interests were therefore ren
dered unperfected. Section 9-312(4) provided no clue as to how to
treat purchase money priority when all perfection had lapsed.
Lapsed perfection was a most painful subject under the 1962
Code."® It was generally agreed that interests arising after the lapse

J. White & R. Summers, supra note 13, § 25-11, at 1064.
Attachment of these two security interests, of course, will generally occur simultaneously,
i.e., when the debtor obtains rights in the collateral. See supra text accompanying note 21.
A number of sections of Article 9 allow for the possibility of lapse. See U.C.C. § 9-103
(1972) (four-month temporary perfection when goods are moved to another state or, in the case
of mobile goods or intangibles, when the debtor's headquarters are moved); id. § 9-304(4) (21day grace period for interest in instruments or documents of title); id. § 9-306(3) (10 days
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were to be given priority as if the security interest were unperfected.
But there were two schools of thought about interests that arose before
the lapsed^" Some thought that the lapse was prospective only, and
benefited only claimants with interests arising after the lapse. As to
prelapse claimants, they were to be treated as if the lapse had never
occurred. Their junior priority was frozen in place f o r e v e r . T h e
second school of thought was that when perfection lapsed, it was
repealed nunc pro tunc. This view is reflected in the 1962 comments
to section 9-103.Under this view, the courts were supposed to treat
priorities of prelapse interests under the assumption that the security
interest's perfection had never existed.
With regard to fixture disputes under the 1962 Code, the "pro
spective" school would have said that the priorities before the lapse

temporary perfection for some identifiable proceeds); id. § 9-403(2) (lapse after five years from
filing).
See Breitowitz, supra note 59, at 404-08.
This view can be seen in cases arising under section 9-103 of the 1962 Code, which
provided that if personal property subject to a perfected security interest was moved to another
state, the secured party had a four-month grace period in which to perfect in the new state. If
reperfection was not achieved within this period, the choice between prospective and retrospec
tive effect of lapse would determine the priority between the security interest and a party who
purchased during the four-month period.
A number of jurisdictions have interpreted the four-month provision as entirely prospective.
Thus, even if the secured party failed to refile within four months of removal, he did not become
subordinate to the rights of an individual who purchased the property during the grace period.
Pasack Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Ritar Ford, Inc., 6 Conn. Cir. 489, 276 A.2d 800 (1970);
American State Bank v. White, 217 Kan.78, 535 P.2d 424 (1975); Community Credit Co. v.
Gillham, 191 Neb. 198, 214 N.W.2d 384 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Novak v. Nelson,
209 Neb. 728, 311 N.W.2d 8 (1981); Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 A.D.2d
560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68
Misc.2d 228, 327 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Civ. Ct. I97I); AI Maroone Ford, Inc., v. Manheim Auto
Auction Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 290 (1965); Morris v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 10
Wash. App. 129, 516 P.2d 1055 (1973).
The four-month period is long enough for a secured party to discover in most cases
that the collateral has been removed and to file in this state; thereafter, if he has not
done so, his interest, although originally perfected in the state where it attached, is
subject to defeat here by those persons who take priority over an unperfected security
interest. . . . Under Section 9-312(5) the holder of a perfected conflicting security
interest is such a person even though during the four-month period the conflicting
interest was junior.
U.C.C. § 9-103 comment 7 (Official Text 1962).
See Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Iowa L. Rev.
346, 377-79 (1962); cf. United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 803 (S.D. Iowa 1974) ("[I]t
would seem that the failure to file, in essence, relates back . . . ."). The decision in Squires seems
to rest on the court's sympathy for the good faith purchaser, who bought without any knowledge
of the existence of a competing interest. See also General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash.
2d 234, 238, 581 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1978) (lapse under section 9-403(2) said to be retrospective
with regard to judicial liens arising before the lapse).
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were frozen and that the purchase money lender won. The retroactive
school would have treated this as a priority battle between two unperfected security interests. In a purchase money versus after-acquired
property case, the priority was very tricky, since attachment of the
two interests would have occurred simultaneously—when the debtor
obtained rights in the collateral. Section 9-312(5)(b) instructed that,
where no one has perfected, priority is to be given to the first security
interest to attach. Rut it did not resolve cases of simultaneous attach
ment. Perhaps the secured parties should have split the collateral
between them.''''' In addition, a secured party relying on section 93I2(5)(b) was in a most precarious position. The first secured party to
make a fixture filing would capture seniority, and since repossession
was a form of perfection,'^® the repossessing secured party would
automatically establish seniority. In any case, if the retroactive school
of thought held the correct view on lapsed perfection, section 9-312
became a treacherous means by which to determine priorities.'^®

As authority for the concept that the secured parties should divide the collateral, see
Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916). In this case, two creditors docketed
judgments against the defendant at a time when he had no real estate. The docketing of the
judgments would have created liens on his real estate, if he had any. Later, the judgment debtor
inherited some real estate, to which the liens attached immediately and simultaneously. The
New York Court of Appeals assumed that these parties should share the proceeds on a pro rata
basis.
In re Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1968); Trans
port Acceptance Corp. v. Crosby, 19 Bankr. 436, 438 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Stanley v. Fabricators,
Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1969); see U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978).
In Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. 266, 246 S.E. 2d
354 (1978), the Georgia Court of Appeals considered priorities between an after-acquried
property security interest and a purchase money security interest. Each had perfected by
ordinary UCC means in a timely fashion, and neither had perfected with a fixture filing. Upon
affixation, perfection of both security interests lapsed.
The court awarded victory to the purchase money lender, but not under the prospective
theory of lapsed perfection. Instead, the court focused on the fact that the after-acquired
property party also had a real estate mortgage. Under the 1962 Code, which was then in effect in
Georgia, the after-acquired party as mortgagee was clearly subordinate under section 9-313(2).
The court, without much discussion, simply assumed that the after-acquired property interest
should also be subordinated in the interest of preserving the full effect of section 9-313(2). Section
9-312(4) was never mentioned.
A similar case, where the after-acquired property party had both a mortgage and a security
interest in after-acquired property, is Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780,
315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1970). In this case the purchase money lender lost. First of all, he did
not file in time to take advantage of section 9-312(4). That made the after-acquired property
interest senior to the purchase money security interest. Second, the court assumed that attach
ment of the security interest occurred after affixation of the collateral to the real estate. This
made the purchase money security interest subordinate to the mortgage under section 9-313(3).
As to the latter point, the court equated attachment with the debtor signing the security
agreement which occurred after affixation. While this is possible, it is more likely that the parties
had orally agreed to a security interest at the time of the sales contract. Under the 1962 Code, a
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Under the 1972 Code, use of section 9-312 to solve such disputes
seems less problematic. Perfection no longer lapses under the 1972
version of the Code. Therefore, since one need not face the lapse
question, section 9-312 seems easier to use. But the 1972 amendments
also introduced a very broad definition of "encumbrance." Section 9312 is usable only if Professors White and Summers have presumed
correctly that security interests are not real estate encumbrances
within the meaning of section 9-105(g). I would suggest that the
definition does indeed fit security interests on fixtures and that these
priority problems are better decided under section 9-313 than under
section 9-312.
According to section 9-105(g), " 'encumbrance' includes real es
tate mortgages and other liens on real estate and all other rights in real
estate that are not ownership interests . . . ." Fixtures are real es
tate,'^'' and security interests are liens.Therefore, the definition
seems to fit. If it does, then each fixture party is an "encumbrancer"
with regard to the other.
The result is that, in most cases, the first secured party to make a
fixture filing will win under section 9-313(4)(b). The only exception to
this is in the case of collateral qualifying under section 9-3I3(4)(c)—
readily removable office machines and consumer appliance replace
ments. In such a case, ordinary UCC filings are sufficient to beat prior
and subsequent encumbrancers, and so section 9-312 could be applied
safely here. But section 9-313(4)(c) does require perfection before
affixation. In a case where one of the parties has not perfected by this
deadline, the prior perfected secured party wins under either section
9-312 or 9-313(4) (c), except in one case. If the unperfected secured
party is a purchase money secured party, section 9-312(4) would
award him victory if he eventually perfects within the ten-day grace
period. But under section 9-313(4) (c), the earlier perfected security
interest beats the purchase money lender who files after affixation and
within the 9-312(4) grace period, because the purchase money security

mere oral agreement to create a security interest established attachment. See supra note 124. One
suspects that the court did not understand the significance of any oral agreement preceding the
written agreement.
If, in Sunshine, there had been an oral agreement before affixation, the purchase money
secured party would have been senior to the mortgage under section 9-313(2). However, he still
would have been junior to the mortgagee's security interest under section 9-312.
"[Gjoods are 'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that an interest
in them arises under real estate law." U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1972).
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. V 1981) (" 'security interest' means lien created by
agreement").
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interest is an "encumbrancer," and the other secured party has com
plied with section 9-313(4)(c). In this narrow circumstance, sections 9312 and 9-313 are in conflict.
In any case, section 9-313(4)(a) is totally irrelevant to disputes
between secured parties over fixtures. That section requires the "en
cumbrance" to have existed on real estate before affixation. Since
affixation creates "encumbrancehood" for both parties, neither party
can ever satisfy this requirement as against the other.
That leaves us with section 9-313(4) (b), where the first party to
make a fixture filing wins. Use of this section instead of section 9-312
achieves an important objective. It eliminates the possibility of a
circular priority when a real estate mortgagee or some equivalent real
estate claimant is in the picture. As between the two security interests
and the mortgage, the first to make a real estate recording clearly
wins. But if section 9-312 applies between the secured parties inter se,
a secured party who is senior to the mortgagee may easily wind up
junior to a secured party who has never made a fixture filing but who
perfected by ordinary UCC means in time to assure priority under
section 9-312. Thus, the secured party with a fixture filing could beat
a mortgagee, who beats a secured party with no fixture filing, who in
turn beats the secured party with a fixture filing. If we assume that all
fixture interests are encumbrances, we avoid this circular priority,
and we award victory to the party who first recorded an interest in the
real estate records.
Superficially, it may seem that secured parties who may not
know whether the collateral will become fixtures should be able to
rely on the usual UCC rules and should not have the extra burden of
worrying about the real estate records. It is true that, in creating
priority rules, we should be wary of generating added expense for
assuring seniority. This additional burden undoubtedly raises the cost
of secured lending and is therefore undesirable. But we face no danger
of generating such costs here. The duty to police the collateral for
affixation already exists. Secured parties must already make fixture
filings after affixation in order to beat real estate claimants. It is
therefore not unfair to make secured parties undertake the same filing
to beat other secured parties as well. Furthermore, as between a
secured party who has policed the collateral in this regard and has
made the fixture filing, on the one hand, and the secured party who
has neglected this duty which is clearly imposed on him, it seems just
to reward the secured party who followed the course imposed by the
UCC over the party who did not.
To summarize, Professors White and Summers may have been a
little too brief in dealing with priorities between two secured parties
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with fixture interests. Under the 1962 Code, we are forced to deal
with the difficult riddle of lapsed perfection. It is, therefore, not so
clear what those priorities are even if section 9-312 applies. Under the
1972 amendments, the definition of "encumbrance" is so broad that it
is hard to see how a security interest in fixtures does not qualify. If it
does, the problem is better resolved under section 9-313(4)(b) than
section 9-312, since we can avoid a circular priority and thereby
reward the secured party who best polices his collateral in exactly the
way the UCC demands that it be policed. That is, we will be favoring
the secured party who first makes a fixture filing.
V. Use of Sections 9-401(2) and (3) to Cure a Lack of a Fixture Filing
Sections 9-401(2) and (3) are rare instances where the harsh
realities of Article 9 perfection are tempered. Ordinarily, a secured
party who files in the wrong place is deemed unperfected and will
probably lose a priority battle to his competitor even when the com
petitor was in no way misled. The UCC is largely a "race" statute,
and knowledge of the competing claimant is usually irrelevant.'^® In
contrast, section 9-401(2) protects the secured party in cases where he
filed in the wrong place, provided the competing claimant had knowl
edge of the contents of the financing statement.'®® In addition, section
9-401(3) protects him in cases where he filed initially in the right place
but where the collateral has undergone a "change of use."'®' Both
these sections relieve the secured party from problems with the loca
tion of filing.
It is a mystery whether and how these sections of the UCC might
apply to fixture cases. Section 9-401(2) is not particularly trouble
some. It was utterly unhelpful in fixture cases under the 1962 Code,'®^

»» But see U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(d), -314(3) (1972).
Section 9-401(2) of the 1972 Code provides;
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places
required hy this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to
which the filing complied with the requirements of this Article and is also effective
with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any person who
has knowledge of such financing statement.
Section 9-401(3) provides;
A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues effective even
though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral or
its use, whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed.
'5® Section 9-401(2) is only useful where perfection is useful. Under the 1962 version of section
9-313, real estate claimants who were earlier in time had their priorities established without
regard to perfection of the security interest. Id. § 9-313(2)-(3) (1962). Subsequent real estate
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and, if applied to fixture cases under the 1972 amendments, it raises
few unsettling problems. Section 9-401(2) subordinates only those
parties with actual knowledge.'®^ If real estate claimants are subordi
nated under this principle, it will not undermine the guiding principle
of both the 1962 and 1972 versions of section 9-313 that real estate title
searches should be limited to searches of the traditional real estate
records and should not include searches of the UCC files.'®''
Application of section 9-401(3) is another matter. This section
relieves the secured party from having to refile every time the debtor
changes the "use" of the collateral.'®® Change of use may change the
location of the proper place to file. Thus, when a consumer appliance
is used in a business and therefore becomes equipment, the latter two
alternative texts of section 9-401(1) tell us that the proper place to file
is the office of the secretary of state, not merely the office in the
county where the debtor resides.'®® Section 9-401(3) is of great value to
the secured party here.
An unanswered question is whether affixation of collateral to real
estate is a "change of use." Consumer goods remain consumer goods
once they become fixtures, and therefore it is open to argument that
affixation alone is not a change of use.'®''' But section 9-401(3) seems to
contemplate protection whenever an event happens that changes the
proper place to file. Very frequently affixation will change the loca
tion of the proper place to file. Linguistically, one cannot be certain

claimants (where there was no fixture filing) were subordinated whenever they had knowledge
of the underlying security interest, a standard of knowledge less rigorous than the standard
required by section 9-401(2). Therefore, section 9-401(2) is irrelevant in fixture cases decided
under the 1962 Code.
There is no "shelter" provision in this section. Therefore, a security interest junior in the
hands of a party with knowledge becomes senior in the hands of a good faith assignee.
See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46.
It should be noted that there are two alternative versions of section 9-401(3). The first
protects the secured party from having to refile whenever the debtor changes his residence, place
of business, or the location of the collateral. The second protects the secured party from such
changes only for four months. Each version, however, protects the secured party if the use to
which the collateral is put undergoes change.
Under the first option of section 9-401(1), every security interest not connected with real
estate must be filed with the secretary of state, so that the example in the text would not cause a
change in the place to file. Under the second option, the proper place to file would change to the
secretary of state's office. Under the third option, the result is the same, except that if the debtor
has but one place of business in the state, a second filing would have to be made in the local
county.
Section 9-109 divides "goods" into "consumer goods," "inventory," "equipment" and "farm
products." It could be that change of use only refers to transfers between the categories within
section 9-109. It might therefore not include changes between personal property status and real
property status.
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that affixation is not a change of use within the meaning of section 9401(3).
Another problem with the application of both sections 9-401(2)
and (3) to fixture cases is that each subsection refers to financing
statements being "effective." Under section 9-401(2), the financing
statement is effective against knowledgeable parties, while, under
section 9-401(3), a financing statement remains effective in spite of
subsequent changes in the proper place to file.
These sections are written as if the only obstacle to perfection is
that a financing statement is filed in the wrong place. In fixture cases,
it may well be that once the location error is corrected, a financing
statement is still deficient under section 9-402(5) because there is no
description of the real estate. Do sections 9-401(2) and (3) also correct
formal insufficiencies as well as location errors?
Read literally, the proclamation that financing statements are or
continue to be "effective" suggests that all errors are corrected. If so,
failure to describe the real estate in the financing statement does not
prevent the application of these sections in fixture disputes. But there
are two monumental objections to this reading. First, if failure to
meet the requirements of section 9-402(5) can be ignored in the inter
est of making financing statements fully effective, why cannot other
omissions in the financing statement be cured as well? If the financing
statement is filed in the wrong place, or if a change in use or the
debtor's location occurs after filing in the right place, do sections 9401(2) and (3) paper over the failure of the debtor to sign the financ
ing statement? If it does, why should a secured party who makes an
error under section 9-401(2) or who benefits from the fortuity of
changed circumstances under section 9-401(3) benefit from forgive
ness of section 9-402 errors when secured parties who do not make
errors have no such advantage?'®® One possible answer is that, at least
under section 9-401(3), the financing statement is to continue effec
tive. Thus, if the financing statement was not originally effective,
section 9-401(3) cannot very well continue that which never existed.
Thus, section 9-401(3) requires that the debtor sign the financing
statement and do the other things necessary to make the financing
statement good as to unaffixed collateral. In such a case, the real
estate description might be left out and the financing statement could
still continue to be effective. Not so when another more fundamental
All secured parties benefit from section 9-402(8), which excuses "minor errors which are
not seriously misleading." I am assuming that the errors under consideration would he consid
ered major omissions. See In re Keefer, 26 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983) (omission of
debtor's address was a major faux pas).

426

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:381

type of defect in the financing statement exists. In that case, an
effective financing statement never existed.
This argument works less successfully with section 9-401(2),
which speaks of the financing statement being totally effective if the
requirements of section 9-401(2) are met. With this section, we cannot
so easily rely upon the notion that the financing statement must have
been adequate at some time in its life, as we could with section 9401(3).^®® Instead, we are faced with a choice: section 9-401(2) cures
all formal defects in the financing statement, or it cures none. The
latter view seems more rational, in which case the failure to describe
real estate in the financing statement may render section 9-401(2)
unusable in fixture cases.
Even this view raises troubling inconsistencies. For instance, a
competing real estate claimant may have all the knowledge required
by section 9-401(2), including knowledge of the real estate where
affixation occurred. But because the financing statement did not de
scribe what the competing claimant already knew, section 9-401(2)
could not be used to subordinate that claimant. This reduces section 9401(2) to a somewhat fatuous provision as applied in fixture eases.
Whereas the use of section 9-401(2) in fixture cases is obviously
not a serious impediment to the legislative intent behind section 9-313,
the use of section 9-401(3) would completely devastate the legislative
scheme. Therefore, 1 would propose that section 9-401(3) be barred
from use in fixture cases. A principal theme behind section 9-313 is
that real estate title searchers should be entitled to rely on the state of
the real estate record and should not have to start searching UCC files
as well. An exception is made under section 9-313(4)(c), where the

There is language in section 9-401(2) that superficially supports the view that formal errors
are not corrected. That section states that wrongfully filed financing statements are "nevertheless
effective with regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of
this Article [regardless of knowledge] and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the
financing statement against any person who has knowledge . . .
U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972)
(emphasis added). One could read the first clause to require that financing statements must
always comply with all other requirements except the place of filing, including the requirements
of section 9-402. But the intent of the first clause seems to be somewhat different. The clause in
italics is designed to establish that a financing statement filed in the right place for a part of the
collateral remains effective to perfect an interest in that part of the collateral. It does not follow
inexorably that financing statements which are filed in the wrong place for all the collateral must
conform in all ways to section 9-402, although for other reasons, I think that this is the view that
should be taken.
Alternatively, it could be argued that "filing" or "financing statement" as used in sections 9401(2) and (3) refer to a "sufficient financing statement" within the meaning of section 9-402.
Because of the policy matters to be discussed in the text, this must be the proper reading of these
sections.
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ready removability of the collateral puts the title searcher on his
guard. But applicability of section 9-401(3) Avould make ordinary
UCC filings prior to affixation universally good against real estate title
searchers. Real estate claimants would therefore be forced to under
take the search of the UCC files in derogation of the legislative intent,
because they could never be sure that a UCC filing would not "con
tinue effective" against them under section 9-401(3). In essence, the
liberal rule of section 9-313(4)(c) would be made generally applicable
to all kinds of collateral and would swallow up section 9-313(4)(a), in
that preaffixation perfection of any kind would be universally effec
tive against all prior or subsequent real estate claimants. This is
especially true because section 9-401(3) contains no good faith re
quirement of any kind, as does section 9-401(2). Therefore, a secured
party could rely on a UCC filing before affixation and would never
have an incentive to make a fixture filing, as required by subsections
9-313(4)(a) and (b).'®°
For this reason, the only acceptable reading of the statutes is that
subsections 9-401(2) and (3) do not correct errors in complying with
section 9-402.^®' Furthermore, even if the secured party has correctly
listed the real estate and the other required items, so that there are no
omissions, section 9-401(3) should never be used under any circum
stances in a fixture case, since its use would obliterate a key objective
of section 9-313—limitation of the real estate title search. A secured
party who has made a UCC filing prior to affixation should be re
quired to make a fixture filing to gain priority over purchasers, mort
gagees and prior lien creditors, unless the collateral falls within the
"readily removable" category of section 9-313(4) (c).

Professor Adams adds a sophisticated statutory argument to support this view. He believes
that section 9-401(3) was available under the 1962 Code to save fixture lenders, a view with
which I take issue, since it would have destroyed the reliability of the real estate records with
regard to fixtures. He goes on to note that the "proper place" to file a financing statement for
goods that, at the time of attachment, are not intended to be fixtures was wherever other
nonfixture filings had to be made. Professor Adams comes to this conclusion from the following
language which appeared in all three alternatives for section 9-401(1) of the 1962 Code; "when
the collateral is goods which at the time the security attaches are or are to become fixtures . . .
then [the filing must be] in the office where a mortgage on the real estate . . . would be filed or
recorded . . . ."In 1972, the italicized words were dropped. This is consistent with the view that
it is never appropriate to file a financing statement on future fixtures in the same place where a
financing statement on nonfixture collateral would be filed, which in turn supports the view that
section 9-401(3) does not relieve the secured party from having to refile a fixture filing after
affixation. See Adams, supra note 1, at 923.
Adams, supra note 1, at 917, specifically recognizes that seetion 9-401(3) does not cure
omissions of information required under section 9-402 of the 1962 Code. If it was true in 1972, it
must have been just as true in 1962.
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Incidentally, a secured party whose collateral becomes affixed
after the security interest attaches is in for a rude shock if he wishes to
correct his filing so that it can become a fixture filing. Such an action
will frequently be necessary whenever affixation was not initially
contemplated. Section 9-402 generally requires the debtor to sign the
financing statement, but numerous exceptions are made where vari
ous kinds of corrections are needed. For instance, when the collateral
is moved or the debtor changes his location to a new state, when
proceeds are generated, or when the financing statement is about to
lapse under section 9-403(2) because five years have gone by since the
initial filing, the secured party may file without the debtor s signa
ture.All other amendments to the financing statement must be
signed by the debtor.Obviously missing from this list of exceptions
to the rule that the debtor must sign is the case where the debtor
affixes encumbered goods to his real estate. Here the debtor could
refuse to sign any amended financing statement; nothing in the UCC
permits the secured party to proceed unilaterally. Nothing short of
equitable relief can enable the secured party to refile so that a proper
fixture filing is in place.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the Review Committee's goal to rid section 9313 of its confusing aspects, the 1972 amendments have resulted in a
set of fixture rules that are quite complex. The question may fairly be
asked, "What is wrong with complexity?" It just may be that on a
functional level there is nothing wrong with the complexity of section
9-313, especially if one believes that fixture priorities are infrequently
litigated and that this entire subject has marginal impact upon our
economy. ^®^ Furthermore, the 1972 version represents a political com
promise; one can hardly expect anything but a hopeless jumble when
compromise is required. Nevertheless, the law of fixtures deserves to
be something more than an asymmetrical morass in an otherwise well
integrated statute.
In the interest of classical symmetry and beauty of design, I
would therefore propose that prior lien creditors be defeasible by

•"2 u.c.c. § 9-402(2) (1972).

See id. § 9-402(4).
According to Professor Henson, fixture priorities are litigated only in times of declining real
estate values, where the sales price is not high enough to satisfy the claims of all the secured
parties. See R. Henson, supra note 34, § 8-1, at 292. But see Coogan, supra note 7, at 1187
(fixture priorities are "important").
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ordinary UCC filings in purchase money cases, that any subsequent
real estate claimant be defeasible by a prior UCC filing under section
9-313(4)(c) (even where the filing is after affixation), that purchase
money status be eliminated from section 9-3I3(4)(a),'®® and that a
grace period against subsequent lien creditors be given to secured
parties in purchase money cases. Furthermore, discretionary advances
under a junior mortgage should not be permitted to become senior
over a perfected security interest.'®® No doubt these suggestions will
have little impact on the current trajectory of the American economy,
whatever that may be, but they would lend some symmetry to an
otherwise inexplicably bizarre set of priorities for security interests in
fixtures under the UCC.

The reason purchase money security interests are even mentioned in section 9-313(4)(a) is
that the drafters apparently wanted to draw a parallel to section 9-312(4). U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)
comment 4(a) (1972). That is, only purchase money security interests deserve grace periods. See
id. § 9-313 (Reasons for 1972 Change). That may be true with regard to grace periods, but it
does not follow that only purchase money security interests should defeat prior real estate
claimants. Purchase money priority is based on a variation of "first in time is first in right and
on the basis that purchase money collateral increases the debtor's estate, so that denial of the
increase to prior parties is not prejudicial. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23. But these
reasons apply to all fixture security interests, regardless of purchase money status. Thus, a fixture
interest, where attachment precedes affixation, is first in time, and the addition of encumbered
fixtures to the real estate is a windfall to the prior real estate claimants unless superpriority is
given to the fixture lender. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. Therefore, we should
eliminate purchase money status from section 9-313(4)(a) in general, so that any security interest
can take priority over earlier real estate claimants. If parallelism is valued, perhaps the grace
period could be reserved for purchase money security interests, but it should apply as well to
purchase money security interests in collateral that qualify under section 9-313(4)(c).
See supra note 73.

